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MARGINS
Why Support 
Bill?
Bill Clinton is the Bob Hawke of 
American politics. Like Hawke, as 
president he will create oppor­
tunities for others to radically over- 
haul A m erica 's  econom y and  
society.
Gough W hitlam  has recently  
pointed to the dangers of supporting 
politicians for the sake of winning 
elections. But for all the matters of 
principle for which men like Whit­
lam and Evatt fought, to the lasting 
benefit of all Australians, we should 
never forget the consequences of 
staying out of government. It is bet­
ter to fight and win as a member of 
a broad-based winning coalition 
than to fight and lose as part of an 
ideologically pure elite.
After 12 years of Reagan and Bush 
much of the American Left is iso­
lated from federal politics. The ques­
tion of working in a coalition with 
Democrats like Clinton is hardly 
comprehensible. There is a great 
deal of idealistic talk about a new 
American Labor party, but despite 
the organising efforts of people like 
Tony M azziochi of the Oil and 
Chemical Workers, it is generally a 
forlorn effort. The most impressive 
work being done by the American 
Left, from which we have much to 
learn, is confined to local and 
municipal levels. But for most local 
American lefties a federal victory is 
seen as pie in the sky, or irrelevant,
or too much to hope for, or all of the 
above.
On top of this, Bill Clinton is fre­
quently derided by the American 
Left on matters of principle, charac­
ter and ethics. The most substantial 
criticism s concern Clinton's ad­
vocacy of the death sentence, his 
failure to support unionism and to 
prosecute delinquent employers in 
Arkansas. Despite these genuine 
shortcomings, however, the Clinton 
cause is appealing because some­
thing must be done to combat the 
utter depravity of American society.
In some ways Clinton is a more im­
pressive character than Hawke be­
cause he is a mover and shaker and 
not just a consensus builder-cum- 
negotiator. Clinton has achieved 
minor miracles over ten years under 
extrem e, adverse conditions in 
Arkansas, the second poorest US 
state. And the Democratic centre 
group that surrounds Clinton is a 
more impressive intellectual force 
than Australian Labor's right and 
centre.
An impressive, intellectually open, 
centrist political leader is worth sup­
porting in a period of economic tur­
moil. In 19911 travelled through 42 
cities in the United States, talking 
about the Accord and the Australian 
health  care system . Alm ost 
everywhere I went Americans were 
waking up from a nightmare. They 
were even prepared to examine and 
compare the experiences of foreign­
ers with their own. The Australian 
Accord, for example, was hailed as a 
triumph. Even Lane Kirkland's as­
sistant secretary at the peak union 
body, the AFL-CIO, Ken Young, san- 
guinely recalled that there had been 
an opportunity to forge a similar 
agreement with Jimmy Carter just 
before he left office. 100 million 
Americans have inadequate access 
to health care, so our national health 
care system was not just envied, it 
was seen as the crowning glory of 
civilisation down under.
Most Australians could hardly con­
ceive of the scale and scope of the 
deindustrialisation of America. The
quality of life in many of America's 
deindustrialised cities is worse than 
that in m any Third  W orld 
economies. In Australia in the 1980s 
a tripartite agreement saved the 
major industrial bases of Wollon­
gong and Newcastle; in America, 
whole cities like Pittsburgh, Detroit, 
Buffalo and a myriad of others were 
utterly destroyed.
Despite our continued, ludicrous 
commitment to tariff reductions in 
the middle of a recession, we have 
had relatively  rational debates 
within the labour movement about 
our ability to sustain manufacturing 
industries such as textile, clothing 
and footwear (TCF). In America the 
winds of the market blew and now 
in New York City in the TCF in­
dustry there is a return to Dickensian 
child labour.
While we did, however inadequate­
ly, retrain workers, create jobs and 
encourage industry to modernise, in 
the United States m illions were 
thrown into oblivion. It was left to 
the Taylorist cretins in executive 
boardrooms as to whether or not 
they should modernise their tech­
nology and upgrade their workers' 
skills.
W hile our federal governm ent 
moved to rationalise the respon­
sibilities of state and federal govern­
ments in order to provide for securer, 
more responsible and accountable 
public services and infrastructure, 
the US federal government irrespon­
sibly borrowed for non-productive 
spending and buckpassed their 
responsibilities, resulting in a fiscal 
crisis for over 20 states and countless 
municipal authorities.
I would be the last to deny the mis­
takes and problems of Labor in 
governm ent in Australia under 
Hawke and Keating. But to have a 
Labor government in power in the 
1980s made a difference—in an in­
ternational sea of conservatism— 
just as Bill Clinton will now make a 
difference in the United States.
PETER BOTSMAN is the executive 
director of the Evatt Foundation.
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PROFILE
The Brady Bunch
At a Sydney theatre opening night 
in September, a manager of a com­
puter softw are com pany was 
m obbed by the audience and 
hassled for photos and autographs. 
He wasn't even in the play, yet he 
was confined to the theatre for al­
most an hour after the performance 
by the adoring hordes. He wore a 
quite unhip jacket and went by the 
unassuming name of Chris Knight. 
But Chris Knight has a dim, dark 
secret. He was Peter Brady.
In 1969 the lovely lady with three 
lovely girls and the man who was 
busy with three boys of his own 
decided that they had much more 
than a hunch, and decided to join 
clans. The Brady Bunch spent the next 
five years setting up pressing family 
problems (Jan feels neglected as mid­
dle child; Greg wants to move into a 
room of his own) which could all be 
solved within 30 minutes, including 
commercials. The show was canned 
in 1974 and went on to syndication 
re-run heaven. The cast seemed des­
tined for the 'Where Are They Now?' 
file, only kept alive in the memories 
of fanatics who knew the name of 
Cindy's doll, what Alice's sister was 
called, and Marcia's bra size. That all 
changed this year.
Barry Williams (who played Greg) 
kicked things off with his book, 
Growing Up Brady, which regaled us 
with tales of mischief—like the time 
he was stoned on marijuana on the 
set; a scene in which he was sup­
posed to be pumping up a tyre on his 
bike became an intense experience 
w here he attem pted to form a 
relationship with each spoke on the 
wheel. He revealed what all Brady 
fans suspected—he was infatuated 
with Maureen McCormick (who 
played Marcia), Peter and Jan had a 
romantic liaison, and Cindy and 
Bobby actually used to make out in' 
Tiger's doghouse! In the book's most 
talked-about section he recounts 
details of a date with his screen 
mother, Florence Henderson. Unfor­
tunately, this Oedipal turn of events 
never emerged in a Brady script. 
Then Robert Reed (who played dad, 
Mike Brady) died of an AIDS-related 
illness and the tabloids and glossies
went into overdrive. By this stage a 
theatre troupe had been having suc­
cess in the States with The Real Live 
Brady Bunch, which involved actors 
re-enacting episodes word-for-word 
on stage, with extra innuendo and 
exaggerated character tics.
One reason for this Bradymania is 
surely our current fascination with 
all things 70s. It started with the 
music. The robotic beats, repetitive 
melodies and strobe lights of House 
music at warehouse parties and in 
nightclubs sparked a disco revival. 
Hand-in-hand with that came an as­
similation of 70s fashion. The gaudy 
jewellery, flared pants, patterned 
vests and chunky platform shoes 
were snapped up from city op-shops 
and adapted to new designs. 'Dag 
nights' and 70s theme parties were 
suddenly en vogue.
The Bradys were so 70s it hurt. They 
started sedately enough with jeans 
and sneakers, but quickly took on the 
accoutrements of the decade which 
put the flair into flares. The girls had 
long straight hair parted down the 
middle, and favoured bell-bottoms 
and ponchos. The boys wore shirts 
with patterns so wild and bright that 
you could only look at them directly 
with the aid of sunglasses. And the 
collars were so wide that the actors 
could have jumped off cliffs and 
glided safely to the bottom.
But perhaps most importantly, the 
message that was rammed home 
week after week was that the family, 
as long as it stuck together, could 
surmount any problem. With a little 
understanding and a whole lot of 
brotherly/sisterly love, no one had 
to feel left out or persecuted. In the 
90s, when children from broken 
homes are par for the course, this 
funny little TV world of domestic 
harmony with occasional minor, 
non-threatening upheavals looks 
like a comforting fairytale.
You could always tell when things 
got incredibly serious on The Brady 
Bunch; Mike would call a family 
meeting! He would lay down the law 
of the land, explain things reasonab­
ly, and Carol would nod sympatheti­
cally like a good wife. This seemed to 
be her major role on the show, as she 
didn't have a job and Alice the 
housekeeper handled most of the 
chores.
Australia didn't get the series until 
1974, but it was repeated in its en­
tirety five times up until 1987. As a 
result everyone from teenagers to 
thirtysomethings has grown up with 
the Bradys. At the premiere of The 
Real Live Brady Bunch they all lined 
up to get Chris Knight's autograph, 
and every one of them knew his char­
acter's most famous line from the 
show. For those who are unaware of 
those enigmatic words which mean 
so much to so many, they are as fol­
lows: "pork chops and apple sauce".
BARRY DIVOLA writes for Who 
magazine, and has a worrying obsession 
with American television.
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LETTER
FROM
1.ONDON
Wrecking Crew
British PM John Maj or looks a mild 
and inoffensive man. It's hard to 
see him as the boss of a wrecking 
crew that has virtually demolished 
the British economy. Yet his unas­
suming exterior masks the dis­
astrou s com b in ation  of a 
fundamental aimlessness with an 
utter dogmatism about specific 
policies.
M ajor is convinced, against all 
evidence, that getting inflation 
below 2% will restore the British 
economy to good health. Along with 
his lacklustre Chancellor, Norman 
Lamont, he believes that massive 
unem ploym ent, unprecedented 
levels of bankruptcies and mounting 
numbers of house repossessions are 
a "price worth paying" to get infla­
tion down.
It was John Major as Prime Minister 
who persisted in keeping interest 
rates high, driving Britain ever 
deeper into recession. It was John 
Major as Chancellor (Treasurer) who 
in 1990 took Britain  into the 
European Monetary System (EMS) 
at the unsustainable rate of 2.95 
Deutschmarks (DM) to the pound. 
That policy was foolish then; it was 
insane in September 1992. It was per­
sisted in, despite all the growing
signs of impending disaster, at the 
expense of foreign currency reserves 
and the cred ib ility  of British 
monetary policy, until Major and 
Lamont were driven out of the Ex­
change Rate Mechanism by a tidal 
wave of selling in the markets.
Lamont forced the Treasury to stub­
bornly persist in buying sterling 
from holders who were only too 
happy to get rid of it in mid-Septem­
ber, throwing away billions of dol­
lars to support the pound. By then 
the government was the only buyer 
and its actions were futile, since they 
only served to fuel speculation and 
drive the pound down still further. 
This interventionist folly came from 
a government whose key slogan has 
been: 'You cannot buck the market'. 
This is by no means true as a general 
rule, but in this case, with an almost 
universal belief in financial markets 
in the inevitability of a devaluation 
of the pound, it makes sense.
Major and Lamont have tried to save 
themselves by accusing the German 
Bundesbank of perfidy in not inter­
vening to save the pound. But why 
should the Bundesbank throw good 
money after bad? The Germans had 
in effect offered the UK a devalua­
tion as part of an orderly realign­
ment of currencies within the EMS, 
along with the Italian Lira. The 
British government refused to con­
sider the idea. Revaluation within 
the EMS at the beginning of Septem­
ber would certainly have been a U- 
turn, but it would have maintained 
Britain's position within the EMS. 
As it is the government has been 
forced into a precipitate withdrawal, 
and it has probably wrecked the sys­
tem beyond repair.
Lamont and Major see themselves as 
victims of circumstances beyond 
their control, and their policies as 
essentially right. Given the chance, 
they would have continued to 
sacrifice the real economy to the god 
of 2.95. They are exactly like the 
m indless and rigid believers in 
'sound m oney' who sacrificed 
Britain's poor to the Gold Standard 
in the 1920s. They still insist that the 
goal of negligible inflation remains 
intact and that they will keep interest
rates at a level necessary to achieve 
it. There will be some immediate 
relief for the economy from the 
beneficial effects of the devaluation. 
But high interest rates and a macho 
round of spending cuts in the north­
ern autumn will ensure there is no 
substantial recovery.
And yet: what if Labour had won 
office back in April? Sadly, it would 
have done just as Major has done. 
The Labour leadership were all com­
mitted to the EMS and refused to 
accept that DM 2.95 was unsus­
tainable. Current Labour leader John 
Smith as Chancellor would have 
doggedly held on to an overvalued 
currency. Labour had and has no 
more clue how to handle the ex­
change rate or domestic inflation 
than the Tories. And Labour would 
have had even less credibility with 
the markets.
The only real policy alternative 
available to Labour was twofold: 
first, to admit that the pound was 
considerably overvalued against the 
mark and that Britain would seek 
realignment within the EMS; and, 
second, to insist that domestic infla­
tion be dealt with by an incomes 
policy (like the Accord) and not by 
interest rate hikes and public expen­
diture cuts. Yet those who advocated 
such policies before the April elec­
tions were informed by Labour 
'pragmatists' that they would lose 
Labour the election.
Labour lost the election. It has been 
an ineffectual opposition ever since, 
because it has had nothing of sub­
stance to say about the EMS that dif­
fered from the Tories. It has refused 
to think through the hard issues on 
policy and has accepted feeble com­
promises and positions that make it 
indistinguishable from the Tories. 
Had it honestly faced Britain 's 
problems before April, Labour could 
now take an unassailable political 
lead on the basis of having been 
proven right. Britain needs an Op­
position as never before, and it 
doesn't have one.
PAUL HIRST is professor of social 
theory at Birkbeck College, University 
of London.
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MOVEABLE
FEAST
Blowing a Storm
It was a warm summer's night and 
the breeze played over her nipples 
like a jazz band in the Harlem of 
her soul. The lady sighed, and ar­
ched her back. Her breasts felt 
heavy on her chest, and a thin 
finger of wind reached under the 
plumpest part of her and tickled 
gently, teasingly.
Her sigh m odified  itse lf 
downwards, and the ping ping of 
her clitoris was like the tip tip tap of 
a tiny hammer on a xylophone. A cat 
called in the distance, and the lady 
saw a momentary image of Michelle 
Pfeiffer's lips under the mask in Bat­
man 2. She practised an Antipodean 
purr. But her relevant lips were a lot 
more puckered and in search of 
something harder and longer than 
even Michelle's legs.
The breeze was picking up to the 
near cyclonic. Fury was in Darwin 
on business. Her pick-up truck soul 
w as a Brunsw ick Street 
phenomenon. Would even her eye
be able to identify a single man sans 
beer-gut and sans walksocks? She 
had hoped for an Aboriginal man, 
but for some reason there were no 
Aborigines in this bar. "Quelle 
surprise," she thought, colonially. 
"Must be home with their families."
And then she saw him. A little older 
than her usual preference, playing . 
pool by the pool. There was a 
studied non-bourgeoisness to his 
movements, an "I went to the finish­
ing school of proletarian graces" 
about the way he sauntered. She 
sized him up, her eyes travelling 
down past the pool cue. She 
thought, in an instant's casing, "Ex­
private school boy working for 
Aborigines. Have conscience will 
travel. Not as tall as he'd like to be. 
Works out to maintain his bottom. 
Probably married (i.e. living with 
someone meaningfully with a baby) 
and will therefore not consider a 
local. He suits the requirements."
She cued herself into action—and 
she ain't no Equity member, com­
rades; her mind was on tonight's 
perform ance, not the morning 
reviews. She sauntered up, her hips 
Bacalling, and felt the near invisible 
caress of his eyes as he practised a 
well-executed look-without-offend- 
ing. He played with a piece of chalk 
on the tip of the cue, using a little 
more white than was strictly neces­
sary. Some fell on her fishnets, and 
she saw a tiny smile tinkling at the 
corner of his lips. His voice was like 
the silken sail of a yacht before it 
disappears into the Bermuda tri­
angle.
"Melbourne or Canberra?" he en­
quired.
"Do I look like a public servant?" she 
epeed gently.
Coming up in ALR:
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"No, but you look like you have a 
job," he countered, "so I thought 
probably Canberra, and you don't 
have a tan, so not Sydney. And the 
shoes are Italian."
"He has a brain as well as a con­
science," she thought. "Try some­
thing political to check."
"What type of loser dear? Doctor 
saving the blind or lawyer who 
believes in justice?"
He laughed. "I'm  afraid I'm only an 
anthropologist."
"With or without TV show on SBS?"
"I haven't signed the contract yet," 
he said, looking her straight in the 
face. And then his flickerin g  
cadenced glance over her breasts 
was like a bright butterfly landing 
on a rainforest flower. She felt her­
self grow organically moist.
"Be a concerned greenie to my 
ecosystem," she hazarded, "and I'll 
look over the contract for free. It'd be 
like you were getting $1000 per 
hour. You could pretend you had a 
Lotus, and still hold your head up 
high or\ the morrow, fair prince. 
That's if your neck still works."
His jaw literally dropped for an in­
stant and she inserted the tip of her 
lipstick, gently, oh so gently. He was, 
after all, asking for it. She moved in 
for the kill. "And I'll let you use my 
cellular phone if you have to ring in 
sick tomorrow, in case I give you 
cystitis. I understand the needs of 
the weaker sex, and I have condoms 
in my briefcase."
That did it. He actually blushed 
and— honour of honours in 
Darwin's terms—he left the rest of 
his beer. They walked out together. 
Santa never came into Darwin that 
C hristm as, but the chim ney of 
Fury's compact Victorian terrace 
was more than replete that night as 
they discussed the rejection of the 
insulting doctrine of terra nullius in 
the nicest possible way. Knock 
knock, there is someone home.
Penelope Cottier.
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Beating the Gong
In 1990 the Bureau of Immigration Research funded 
the centre for which I work to produce a study of the 
effects upon immigrant workers of the massive 
changes which took place in the Illawarra region 
during the 1980s. These changes resulted mainly, 
although not exclusively, from the complete 
restructuring of steel production which was carried 
out during the decade. Last month we released the 
final report on the study and were astonished by the 
amount of interest it provoked from the media.
The arrival of news helicopters on the 
university's football field is an event 
usually confined to periods when the 
Wallabies are training there; and we 
are unaccustomed to the release of an 
'academic' report resulting in a large 
colour photograph of one of the 
authors on the front page of the 
region's main newspaper, as well as 
extensive coverage elsewhere. It was 
all a bit of a worry.
No author, of course, actively dislikes 
his or her work getting some recogni­
tion. The real worry was that none of 
us thought that the report contained 
much that was particularly newswor­
thy in the sense that it might have 
come as a surprise to any moderately 
w ell-in form ed  resid en t of this 
country. It certainly should have 
surprised nobody in the region.
The main findings of the report were 
straightforward enough. We found 
that the industrial restructuring of the 
1980s had led to a massive contraction 
in the demand for labour in the steel, 
associated manufacturing and coal in­
dustries and that this contraction of 
demand resulted from sectoral forces, 
most of them related to labour-replac- 
ing technological change; that labour 
displaced from the manufacturing 
sector had not been absorbed into the 
expanding service sector; that expan­
sion of the service sector in the Il­
lawarra had been slower than in the 
nation as a whole and slower than in 
NSW as a whole; and that jobs in the 
service sector had a strong likelihood 
of being both part-time and low-paid. 
Moreover, the 'multiplier effect' of job 
creation in this sector was very low 
and confined to the service sector itself 
(at least regionally).
Our main concern in all of this was the 
migrant workers (mainly of southern 
European origin) who had formed the 
backbone of the steel industry's 
workforce ever since the 50s. These 
were workers who had never ac­
quired any transportable skills in their 
years at BHP and who had generally 
not learned to speak English with any 
degree of fluency either. They had 
been the ideal labour force for the sort 
of operation that BHP had run to the 
end of the 70s, one in which a labour- 
intensive and largely obsolescent 
technology was used to process abun­
dant cheap raw materials in order to 
provide steel for a heavily-protected 
home market.
By the end of the 70s this form of 
production was no longer viable. Not 
only was there overproduction of steel 
on a world scale but the old produc­
tion methods could no longer even 
maintain BHP's position in the home 
market since they were not suscep­
tible to the degree of quality control 
that consumers were demanding and 
not suitable for turning out specialist 
steel products—an area of expanding 
demand. Something had to go, and 
what went was most of the old system 
of production, the majority of the 
workers and whole sections of the 
regional economy.
Over the next decade, BHP reduced its 
workforce from over 20,000 to less 
than 10,000. The number of wage 
employees was reduced from 15,510 
to 6,326. There were also employment 
contractions in other industries, in­
cluding the loss of over 3,000 jobs in 
coalmining alone. Over 20% of the 
jobs available in the region in 1980 
probably disappeared, on-a per­
manent basis, over the subsequent
seven years. It is scarcely surprising, 
then, that the persistence of the then 
Lord Mayor in referring to the region 
as the Leisure Coast produced a great 
deal of bitter laughter locally.
In this process of labour 'shedding', 
workers of all birthplaces suffered but 
migrant workers were hit the hardest 
by far because of their employment 
concentration in the fastest-contract­
ing areas and their inability to find 
alternative employment in the ex­
panding (service) sector.
The largest non-anglophone ethnic 
minority in the region is people born 
in what used to be Yugoslavia. Such 
workers lost roughly the same num­
ber of jobs in the steelworks as British- 
born workers, yet this represented 
over 40% of all jobs held in the region 
by the Yugoslav-born. By contrast, 
British-born job losses represented 
only 14% of the jobs they held in the 
region and for the Australian-born 
(who lost three times as many jobs as 
either of the other two groups, in ab­
solute terms) the equivalent figure 
was only 5.4%. Our survey of ex-steel- 
workers showed that only a third of 
them had found employment sub­
sequent to leaving the steelworks and 
among the non-anglophone migrants 
surveyed only one had found employ­
ment outside the manufacturing sec­
tor.
This process of getting rid of workers 
m ainly  took place under the 
provisions of the Steel Industry Plan, 
negotiated between BHP and the 
newly-elected Hawke government— 
a document superseded in 1988 by the 
Steel Industry Development Agree­
ment. Both are complex documents 
but the guts of them was that, in return 
for massive government handouts, 
BHP agreed to terminate involuntary 
redundancies, reduce its labour force 
by natural attrition and negotiate 
'voluntary' redundancy agreements. 
The company also agreed to maintain, 
and invest heavily in, its steelmaking 
facilities and to develop a number of 
innovative (for BHP) industrial rela­
tions practices such as employee par­
tic ip atio n  and general w orker 
education and training.
Because of these agreements BHP had
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only limited latitude to pick which 
workers it kept and which it 'shed': as 
a result, some rather strange things 
have happened to the composition of 
the workforce at the Port Kembla 
plant. The most notable is that the 
characteristics of the workers who left 
the plant do not seem to have been 
markedly different from those who 
are still there. In other words, the 
smaller workforce of the 90s is probab­
ly just as badly educated, just as lack­
ing in English language skills, and just 
as disadvantaged as the labour force 
of the 70s when it comes to benefiting 
from now modish projects such as 
'worker lifetime education'. Thus, the 
proportion of southern European- 
born workers employed in the Port 
Kembla plant in 1990 was actually 
higher than it was in 1980 and, for all 
the talk of a 'new workplace culture', 
it is the factory fodder of the old 
workplace culture (as well as manage­
ment socialised in the 'old' culture) 
who will have to produce i t
Meanwhile, back in the Lakeside sub­
urbs where migrant workers are con­
centrated, there are crippling rates of 
long-term unemployment which no 
rea listica lly  p red ictab le  rate of 
economic growth is going to cure. 
Workers in their 40s who do not speak 
any more than rudimentary English, 
whose educational background is
HORACEK
poor and whose skills, acquired on the 
job, have been rendered valueless on 
the labour market because of tech­
n ological change have few job 
prospects.
And not just in these suburbs, of 
course. Although it is true that the 
Illawarra has some fairly distinctive 
regional characteristics, it is by no 
means a unique case. What is happen­
ing in this region is happening all over 
Australia's rust belt, in Newcastle, in 
Geelong, in Adelaide and, with a 
vengeance, in Melbourne. An in­
dustrial workforce recruited (to a 
large extent from overseas) to service 
a particular sort of industrial system 
is finding itself stranded by the chan­
ges which are being forced upon that 
system The section of this workforce 
w hich has m anaged to stay in 
manufacturing industry is faced with 
demands which it is ill-equipped to 
handle and the section which has been 
'shed' is largely, as things stand, 
without hope of getting work.
It need hardly be said that the task of 
producing this study was not a happy 
one. The sheer scale of devastation in 
the lives of working people which has 
taken place over the last 15 years is the 
material of the study: and the ap­
parent inability, or, more correctly, 
refusal, of the political class even to
acknow ledge w hat is happening 
forms its backdrop. But maybe there is 
a dim ray of hope to be discerned in 
the story of our study. I started by 
expressing the surprise we felt that 
our report was, in the context of such 
things, such a big story as far as the 
media were concerned. It could have 
been just a slow news day, of course, 
but I would argue something else. 
Whatever its other shortcomings, the 
media has to sell, and that involves at 
least partially holding up a mirror to 
the deep concerns of the people who 
buy. Our study, in a small way, mir­
rored the crisis of the Australian 
economy. It focused what people can 
see happening all around them: things 
which they look at and which make 
them wonder what the hell is going 
on.
When they look to the politicians for 
an answer to this question they get 
replies which they do not understand 
and certainly don't believe. Perhaps 
the interest in our study was a tiny 
expression of this increasing gap be­
tween people's lived reality and the 
way in which politicians try to inter­
pret it for them. Or maybe it was just 
a slow news day.
MIKE MORRISSEY works in the Centre 
for Multicultural Studies, University of 
Wollongong.
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Policing Patriarchy
Earlier this year the NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics 
and Research released a report, D omestic Violence in 
NSW: A R egional Analysis. It concluded that there is 
considerable regional variation in domestic homicide; 
that this variation is associated with socio-economic 
status, low status areas having higher rates of 
domestic homicide; and that there is a link between 
domestic homicide rates and rates of reported 
domestic violence. The report decided that "there is a 
relationship between domestic violence and class".
A key policy implication drawn from 
this finding was that "while all victims 
of domestic violence need protection 
and support, the areas of greatest need 
are in the Western and South Western 
suburbs of Sydney and the Western 
and North Western areas of country 
NSW". The findings elicited a hostile 
response from some spokeswomen for 
women's organisations. Eva Cox was 
quoted in the Sydney Morning Herald 
as com m enting that "W hat Dr 
Weatherburn's figures are saying is 
that poor men belt their wives while 
rich men do not, which is absolute 
nonsense". And "His definition of 
domestic violence is too narrow be­
cause it does not take into account the 
p sy ch o logical v io len ce and the 
threats, which we find in cases involv­
ing middle class women".
The head of the NSW Women's Ad­
visory Council, Jane Stackpool, was a 
little more guarded. She was quoted 
as saying that "the council...had 
worked hard over the past decade to 
convince the community that domes­
tic violence was not confined to certain 
geographical or socio-econom ic 
areas...We have been trying to get the 
message across that domestic violence 
is a serious crime which can happen to 
any woman, and that there are never 
any excuses for it. What this report 
does is create excuses".
The vehemence of this response may 
have been motivated by a tactical con­
cern not to undermine the 'Domestic 
Violence is Everywhere/Domestic 
Violence is a Crime' public awareness 
campaign. Nevertheless, the implica­
tion is that domestic violence is equal­
ly distributed across class, ethnic,
cultural and other divisions. In other 
w ords, dom estic violence is a 
paradigm expression of a generalised 
patriarchy. On this view, to acknow­
ledge different levels of domestic 
violence across such divisions would 
disrupt the campaign by providing an 
'excuse' for domestic violence.
There is a paradoxical 'silencing' 
aspect to such arguments coming 
from women speaking on behalf of 
women's organisations. Paradoxical 
in that feminist campaigns around 
domestic violence, sexual assault and 
incest have often been conducted 
under a banner of 'breaking the 
silence'. It seems that, in the interests 
of 'breaking the silence', it is better that 
certain things are left unsaid, even if 
they are true.
The assumption that underlies the 
'male violence is evenly distributed' 
view is that all men are essentially and 
potentially violent towards their 
female partners and others. Leading 
researchers argue that women fear at­
tack by virtue of being women in a 
male-dominated society. It is argued 
that the greater fear of violence ex­
perienced by women in general 
reflects the level of hidden violence 
against women, the pervasive sexual 
harassm ent and intim idation of 
women by men in all spheres of their 
lives and the 'climate of unsafety' that 
this produces by constantly remind­
ing women of their vulnerability.
Some researchers have developed the 
notion of a 'continuum of sexual 
violence' to encompass what they see 
to be the full range of forms of 
violence, harassment and economic,
psychological and social mechanisms 
of control experienced by women. 
This leads to the conclusion that since 
all women experience sexual violence, 
the division of women into those who 
are victims and those who are not is 
exposed as 'false'. Logically we end 
up with a definition of violence which 
makes victims of all women and of­
fenders of all men, which sees, in Anne 
Edwards' words, violence as "an es­
sential component of relations be­
tween men and women".
The argument concerning the hidden 
nature of violence against women fre­
quently turns on a more fundamental 
point concerning the social organisa­
tion of w om en's opp ression  in 
modern societies: the public/private 
dichotomy. While this distinction is 
subject to many competing interpreta­
tions (in itself a warning as to the 
dangers of generalising its use), its 
most common use is to mark the 
divide between the public life of the 
market, state and politics on the one 
hand, and the private realm of the 
home and domesticity on the other. 
This dualism provides the fundamen­
tal organising matrix of women's ex­
p erien ce, or (in K atherine 
O'Donovan's words) "the social dif­
ferentiation between men and women 
in the gender order has its counterpart 
in the general social distinction be­
tween private and public".
Furthermore, it is argued, the former 
is a legally regulated domain while 
the latter remains largely unregu­
lated. Hence, violence against women 
becom es a h id d en , p rivatised  
phenomenon rather than a matter for 
public, legal control. Moreover, many 
feminists see this privatisation of 
women's existence as itself a form of 
violence, 'the coercion of privacy' 
which reflects as it maintains the in­
stitutionalisation of male domination.
A major problem with this argument 
is that it rests on an idealised concep­
tion of the way the criminal justice 
system , in particular the police, 
operate in the so-called 'p u b lic ' 
sphere. The argument that police
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should simply enforce the law in the 
case of domestic assaults (and other 
forms of violence against women) by 
arresting and charging offenders, as 
they would for any other assault, ig­
nores the particularism and selectivity 
that characterise policing outside, as 
well as within, the domestic sphere. It 
therefore oversimplifies the problems 
entailed in getting the police to behave 
differently, by reducing them to the 
problem of police sexism. However, 
many men as well as women are vul­
nerable to both violence and the ten­
dency for such violence to be officially 
and pop ularly  denied and dis­
regarded. An example can be found in 
the m ost pu blic of these male 
domains, the pub.
An observational study of violence in 
selected licensed premises in Sydney 
found that, in most cases, although 
there was genuine victimisation by an 
aggressor against an undeserving and 
unwilling victim, there was a reluc­
tance to call the police. Moreover, 
when the police were called they rare­
ly took any action beyond advising 
the victims to pursue civil remedies, 
unless the incident could be construed 
as an offence against public order. 
From observation and interviews 
with police, it was concluded that 
police (and managements and staff of 
pubs and clubs) commonly regarded 
violence in such establishments as an 
in-house matter, worthy of police in­
volvement only if and when a breach 
of the peace occurs or is threatened.
Police deferred to the 'authority' of 
managements and staff to handle 
violent incidents in their own way, 
even though violence on the part of 
staff ('bouncers') frequently con­
stituted a major part of the problem. 
And police also appeared to regard 
most victims of such violence as at 
fault, for simply being in a rough place 
or because they were drunk. Interest­
ingly, establishm ents that the re­
searchers classified as particularly 
and consistently violent, were often 
regarded by the police as 'no trouble', 
since their conception of trouble was 
constituted largely by reference to the 
maintenance of what they saw as 
public order rather than what oc­
curred within these places.
It seems clear that police decisions 
about whether or not to act on com­
plaints of violence can't be reduced to 
universal and pre-constituted 
categories—and this includes the 
definitions of 'public' and 'private'. 
Nor are they reducible to some pre­
given set of gender-based dualisms. 
They are more com plex and 
heterogeneous than is allowed for in 
such theories of victimisation.
In her study of the different uses of 
psychiatric measures when process­
ing female and male offenders, Just ice 
Unbalanced, H ilary A llen offers a 
powerful criticism of the essentialist 
nature of many feminist arguments 
concerning law and criminal justice:
The assumption that all social 
relations are predetermined by 
a general oppression of all 
women by all men converts 
any specific discussion of this 
or any other sexual discrepan­
cy into an otiose restatement of 
what is presumed in advance.
In the process, it dismisses as 
insignificant the more specific 
and problematic questions that 
one might otherwise wish to 
ask, such as why only some of 
these (uniformly oppressed 
and homogeneously con­
structed) female subjects are 
exposed to this differential 
psychiatrisation...
This form of analysis also robs 
political questioning of any 
practical significance. If all 
structures of authority, such as 
medicine and the law, are as­
sumed to be fundamentally 
predetermined by the forces of 
patriarchy, then there is no 
point in attempting to weigh 
up the various advantages or 
disadvantages of different so­
cial practices, let alone to inter­
vene in them. Short of a total 
revolution, all political action 
becomes pointless. Such an ap­
proach is simply not useful, 
and the only way to avoid its 
cul-de-sac is to refuse its as­
sumptions from the outset. The 
world is full of sexism, but this 
sexism does not operate 
uniformly nor inexorably, nor 
by any super-human 
machinery.
Extending Allen's critique to debates 
about violence against women, it is 
clear that in the types of feminist
analysis she is criticising, the empiri­
cal differences and discrepancies in 
patterns of violence—its differential 
impact on women, the incidence of 
male victimisation—are reduced to ir­
relevance. There is indeed no dif­
ference, even that between victims 
and non-victims, which is permitted 
to d isturb  the seam less web of 
women's oppression.
Victimisation as well as fear of vic­
timisation is not confined to women; 
nor are v ictim isa tio n  and fear 
uniformly experienced by women. If 
any sense of difference in the ex­
perience of women (or the conduct of 
men) has to be subordinated to essen­
tialist claims concerning the univer­
sality and uniformity of masculine 
violence and female victimisation, 
there will be little point in seeking to 
change particular practices, relation­
ships and conditions which some vic­
tim s confront. And given the 
assum ptions of such fem inist 
analysis, there is no informed basis for 
doing so. Where no pertinent differen­
ces exist for women this side of a total 
revolutionary transformation of a 
male-dominated society, how could a 
difference be made by any action 
which, recognising their common op­
pression, fell far short of at once 
changing the position of all women?
Masculinity is absolutely central to 
the question of violence. But some 
forms of masculinity are dangerous 
and oppressive to men, and to the 
young of both sexes, as well as to 
women. There is a difference between 
victims and non-victims. Addressing 
the problems of violence necessitates 
addressing the conditions of mar- 
ginality of its most frequent and vul­
nerable victims. The differences in 
patterns of violence as they affect 
women from different backgrounds 
are of critical importance in analysing 
and responding to violence. They are 
not inconveniences to be wished away 
or silenced in the interests of protect­
ing the dubious all-encompassing ex­
planatory power of the notion of 
patriarchy.
RUSSELL HOGG and DAVID BROWN 
teach in law at Macquarie University and 
New South Wales University  
respectively.
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DEBT
The August Budget was criticised from all sides: for doing 
too little and too much. Roy Green thinks the critics miss 
the point. The main constraint on a rapid recovery is still 
the balance of payments, even though the government 
would prefer not to talk about it.
p
red ictab ly , the A ugust federal 
Budget has been criticised from both 
sides: both because it tried to do too 
much for the jobless and because it 
did not do enough. However, these criticisms 
miss the point; the major shortcoming of the 
Budget was in fact the failure of the government 
to address Australia's fundamental economic 
problem—the balance of payments constraint on 
the growth of output and employment.
This problem forced its way back onto centre stage last 
month with the announcement of a July current account 
deficit of $1.4 billion, resulting from a record import surge. 
For most commentators, the size of the deficit came as a 
shock. Yet while the July figure may well turn out to be a 
statistical aberration, the trend has been apparent for some 
months.
Indeed, the balance of payments was truly the 'dog that 
did not bark' in this year's Budget. While the demand
stimulus, including a well-targeted short-term job creation 
program, was welcome, its scope and effect were limited 
by the absence of any coherent industry policy measures 
to tackle longer term supply-side weaknesses reflected in 
the widening deficit. All that the combined pressure of the 
ACTU, the manufacturing sector and Labor's own back­
bench could deliver in the deepest recession since the war 
was a $75 million plan to help exporters. And even this 
modest initiative would have been regarded as poison by 
some of the government's free market economic advisers, 
who see no difference between export assistance and tariff 
protection.
Yet there remains a powerful case for industry policy in 
Australia, which becomes increasingly urgent as recovery 
comes into view. As I shall argue here, it is not a case for 
state planning but for a new tripartite framework in which 
ordinary trade unionists themselves can contribute to 
strategies for their companies and, more widely, for sectors 
of industry. The main elements of this case are, first and 
foremost, the constraint placed on growth and employ­
ment by Australia's balance of payments; second, the need 
for manufacturing industry to compete successfully in
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world markets; and third, the impetus provided by 
workplace productivity bargaining. I shall look at these 
elements in turn.
(i) Balance o f payments constraint. Australia's current ac­
count deficit for 1991/2, announced in August just before 
the Budget was $11.8 billion. This may sound a lot, but it 
was substantially less than the figure for the previous year. 
Even so, the point is that as recovery gets under way we 
can expect the deficit to deteriorate again. The biggest 
component of the deficit by far was the $15.7 billion interest 
bill on foreign debt, largely incurred by the private sector 
during the speculative binge of the 1980s. Unfortunately, 
this has now become lead in our saddle, restraining any 
'dash for growth' within relatively tight fiscal boundaries. 
In fact, without this interest bill our external account 
would have appeared much more robust. We earned a 
surplus on our merchandise trade of $3.9 billion; manufac­
tured exports contributed more than $10 billion towards 
this, continuing an upward trend which began as tariffs 
came down. That's the good news, but it would be foolish 
to ignore the bad news.
The problem is that imports, which have temporarily been 
held back by recession, are now showing signs of resuming 
their upward trend as well, outpacing export growth. For 
example, in the July current account figures, while exports 
rose by 1%, imports grew much faster at 6%—further
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increasing the already high ratio of imports to sales. Yet it 
has become fashionable to argue that the current account 
does not matter so long as the rest of the world is prepared 
to finance it through capital inflows. There are at least two 
objections to this view, which have recently been set out by 
Professor Tony Thirlwall in the National Westminster Bank 
Quarterly Review.
The first objection is that the "interest rates will be higher 
than otherwise would be the case in order to finance the 
deficit, or to stop the currency from depreciating". Clearly, 
this has been the case in Australia and, as might be ex­
pected, it has had a ruinous effect on investment, which is 
an essential precondition for growth and competitiveness. 
Second, "no country in the long run can grow at a rate 
faster than that rate consistent with balance of payments 
equilibrium on current account unless it can finance an ever 
growing deficit—which in general it cannot". In other 
words, the balance of payments becomes the ultimate 
constraint on growth, raising the spectre of a damaging 
stop-go cycle which again we have been experiencing here 
in the recent past. In Australia, recent calculations by the 
Employment Studies Centre at the University of New­
castle (by Bill Mitchell, Martin Watts and myself) show that 
just to stabilise net foreign debt at 36% of GDP will require 
a surplus on trade in goods and services of 1% of GDP. 
Without that, external stability—a manageable current ac­
count balance—can be achieved only at the cost of low 
growth and high unemployment (see Table 1).
(ii) Manufacturing industry. We now know that it will not 
be possible to generate trade surpluses of the required 
magnitude through a continued reliance on primary com­
modity exports. Not only are these a declining proportion 
of world trade but their relative prices have also been 
falling steadily over the post-war period. Moreover, recent 
Reserve Bank figures suggest that a reversal of this trend 
is unlikely, with a further 6% drop in commodity prices 
since March, particularly affecting the rural sector. The 
theory of comparative advantage—which claims that the 
interests of all countries are best pursued by each specialis­
ing in a narrow range of products it can produce most 
cheaply—has, in effect, locked Australia into a downward 
spiral of competitive disadvantage.
The source of net export growth in the future lies in 
manufacturing, especially elaborately transformed 
manufactured products (ETMs), which comprise the 
largest and fastest growing segment of world trade (see 
Diagram 1). Yet the legacy of tariff protection in Australia 
is a 'sheltered workshop' manufacturing sector. That is 
why the government was essentially right to pursue a 
program of tariff reductions. The problem, however, was 
that, without an industry policy to support it, the develop­
ment of export competitive manufacturing was made to 
depend entirely upon the market, or what boils down in 
the economists' models to spontaneous entrepreneurial 
combustion'.
While the Prime Minister has understandably made much 
of the growth in manufacturing over the period of the 
Labor government, it should be placed in perspective. This 
growth started from a very low base, and still leaves simp-
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ly and elaborately transformed manufactured exports 
taken together at a relatively small 21% of Australia's total 
exports (see Diagram 2). Similarly, the trebling of ETM 
exports since 1983 to over $10 billion needs to be set against 
the fact that they constitute less than 20% of merchandise 
exports but more than 65% of merchandise imports. In 
other words, despite an overall manufacturing surplus, we 
are stuck with a $22 billion deficit in ETMs.
What can be done? So far, the government's approach to 
manufacturing has encompassed ad hoc industry plans, 
offsets policies and depreciation allowances. It has also 
involved setting up bodies such as Austrade, the National 
Industry Extension Service and Australian Centre for Best 
Practice to advise firms on new production techniques, 
work practices and market opportunities.
Yet, whatever their individual merits, these measures do 
not add up to a coherent industry policy, particularly when 
put in the context of the high interest rate and exchange 
rate regime of the late 1980s. In the end the weight that 
should have been carried by industry policy, especially to 
promote investment, productivity and competitiveness, 
fell upon wages policy instead.
(iii) Workplace bargaining. Most commentators now ac­
knowledge that wages policy under the Accord played a 
key role, at least initially, in promoting non-inflationary 
growth. It soon became clear, however, that the resources 
released by wage restraint were being directed not to 
productive investment but to takeovers and asset specula­
tion. The result was that while Australia enjoyed the fastest 
jobs growth in the OECD, productivity had stalled in just 
the areas where improvements in competitiveness were 
urgently required. Paradoxically, this was further com­
pounded by wage restraint to the extent that relatively 
cheap labour became a disincentive to investment in 
labour-saving technology.
More recently, the carefully-managed transition to 
workplace productivity bargaining within the framework 
of the arbitration system has shifted the focus from 
restraint of nominal wages to control over real unit labour 
costs. In other words, how much workers get paid matters 
less to firms than their total wage costs per unit of output. 
Last October's National Wage Case decision gave effect to 
this new approach to wages policy in the Enterprise Bar­
gaining Principle (EBP), opening up the prospect in 
Australia of a high wage, high productivity economy. In a 
sense, like award restructuring, productivity bargaining 
is an attempt to achieve the objectives of industry policy 
by other means.
The emphasis on joint consultation and agreement by the 
enterprise bargaining principle gives workers and union 
representatives an opportunity to directly influence invest­
ment decisions, and consequently to strike a balance be­
tween investment and consumption in the collective 
bargaining process itself. Indeed, 'industrial democracy' 
is no longer an abstraction, but an integral part of the 
bargaining agenda. The main drawback of workplace bar­
gaining, however—at least from the view point of 
Australia's manufacturing prospects— is its fragmented 
and uncoordinated character.
This is where industry policy fits in, because it would 
permit the development of company investment strategies 
in the wider context of strategies for each sector of industry. 
The worldwide shift from low-cost mass production to 
high-quality flexible manufacturing has reinforced the im­
portance of sector strategies, especially given the trend to 
smaller, more interdependent production units. And it has 
made redundant old debates about state planning versus 
markets, with the skills and initiative of workers themsel­
ves becoming a vital ingredient in success.
A tripartite industry policy does not need to 'pick winners' 
because winners have the scope and capacity to pick them­
selves as part of strategies to which they have con­
tributed—say, in the sector committees of a revamped and 
more powerful Australian Manufacturing Council. These 
strategies would entail a new conception of the Accord in 
which power is devolved to unions and their members at 
the workplace (see my Time for a Turnaround', ALR 136, 
February).
Essentially, the strategies would build upon joint negotia­
tion and agreement at the workplace and emphasise 
'networking' between companies, diversification, closer 
producer-user links, upgraded research and development, 
technology transfer and, where necessary, export facilita­
tion measures. The aim here is competitive advantage 
through co-operation, not protection by another name.
Moreover, the fruits of success would be substantial. As a 
small scale example, the Employment Studies Centre has 
recently calculated the total effect of $100 million of import 
replacement in each of two typical manufacturing sub­
divisions, Transportation Equipment and Paper, and Print­
ing and Publishing. We estimate that this would yield an 
additional 3,800 direct jobs, 1,500 indirect jobs via induced 
domestic spending, additional output of $270 million, an 
improvement in the government's budgetary position of 
$120 million and a reduction of net imports and hence 
improvement in the trade balance of $170 million.
The Prime Minister knows that his best chance at the next 
election is to put some distance between the government's 
approach to the economy and the Opposition's blinkered 
adherence to free market ideology, especially as the 
deregulation tide recedes around the world. The govern­
ment made a start with its One Nation infrastructure 
projects and has now deepened that with the short-term 
public sector job creation program announced in the 
Budget. But these must be accompanied by a longer term 
industry policy, based on the development of workplace 
bargaining, to stake out new ground for Labor's vision of 
the future.
ROY GREEN teaches at the Employment Studies centre, 
University of Newcastle. His Classical Theories o f Money, Out­
put and Inflation has just been published by Macmillan.
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A more banal
POLITICS
Richard Rorty is one of the most challenging 
contemporary philosophers and thinkers. Here he argues 
that, with the demise of the old socialist vision, all that's 
left us is the 'banal' politics of the everyday.
n
n the wake of the events of 1989 and
1991, it has become clear that western 
leftist intellectuals stand in need of a 
new political vocabulary. Visitors 
from postrevolutionary eastern and central 
Europe are going to stare at us incredulously if we 
continue to use the word 'socialism' when we 
describe our political goals. Indeed, given the 
suffering they have endured under regimes that 
called themselves marxist, our eastern European 
friends are likely to feel that marxist rhetoric is 
no more respectable than Nazi rhetoric.
Just as we would be justifiably suspicious of anyone who 
spoke of 'Hitler's excesses', so our colleagues in Czechos­
lovakia and Hungary will be outraged if we continue to 
speak, as many western intellectuals still do, of 'Stalin's 
excesses'. We will have to stop repeating Trotsky's claim
that Stalin betrayed a promising revolution and begin to 
see Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin as Vladimir Nabokov did; as 
three ruthless gangsters, distinguishable only by their fa­
cial hair. We are all accustomed to think of World War Two 
as a good war, but many of us are not yet prepared to think 
of the Cold War as a good war. Yet this is just how the 
Czechs think of it. The Czechs and the Slovaks would be as 
outraged by the suggestion that the West should have 
avoided the Cold War by coming to terms with Stalin in 
1948 as the French would be at the suggestion that Britain 
and the United States should, in 1941, have followed 
through on Chamberlain's betrayal of Benes by betraying 
de Gaulle.
It is going to take a long period of readjustment for us 
western leftist intellectuals to comprehend that the word 
'socialism' has been drained of force—as have been all the 
other words that drew their force from the idea that an 
alternative to capitalism was available. Not only are we 
going to have to stop using the term 'capitalist economy' 
as if we knew what a functioning non-capitalist economy
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looked like but we are going to have to stop using the term 
'bourgeois cultures' as if we knew what a viable non-bour- 
geois culture in an industrialised society would look like.
I am saying these things not as a triumphant Reaganite but 
rather as someone who kept hoping that some country 
would figure out a way to keep socialism after getting rid 
of the nomenklatura. Even now, I am unwilling to grant that 
Friedrich von Hayek was right in saying that you cannot 
have democracy without capitalism. All I will concede is 
that you need capitalism to ensure a reliable supply of 
goods and services, and to ensure that there will be enough 
taxable surplus left over to finance social welfare. The only 
hope for getting the money necessary to eliminate in­
tolerable inequities is to facilitate the activities of people 
like Henry Ford and even Donald Trump. Public virtues, 
as far as we can presently see, will continue to be parasitic 
Upon private vices. Nothing remotely like 'a new socialist 
man' seems likely to emerge.
We will have to work hard to free ourselves of the marxist 
vocabulary to which many of us in academia still cling. But 
I hope that we shall go further. I hope we can admit that 
we have practically nothing in the way of a 'theoretical 
basis' for political action and that we may not need one. As 
Karl Popper pointed out forty years ago, Plato and Marx 
share a certain resemblance. Both thought that they under­
stood deep underlying forces, forces whose direction deter­
mined the fates of human communities. Plato claimed to 
know that justice could not reign until kings became 
philosophers or philosophers kings. He claimed to know 
this on the basis of a searching inspection of the human 
soul. Marx claimed to know that justice could not reign 
until capitalism was overthrown and culture decom­
modified. He claimed to know this on the basis of a deep 
understanding of the movement of history. I hope we have 
reached a time when we can finally get rid of the conviction 
common to Plato and Marx, the conviction that there just 
must be large theoretical ways of finding out how to end 
injustice. I hope we can learn to get along without the
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conviction that there is something deep—such as the 
human soul, or human nature, or the will of God, or the 
shape of history—which provides a subject matter for 
grand, politically useful theory. We should accept the fact 
that from here on in we are going to have to be as crudely 
experimental as the new governments of Poland and 
Lithuania are being forced to be.
Now that we can no longer be leninists, intellectuals have 
to face up to some questions that leninism helped us to 
evade. What is behind the sense of loss that comes over us 
now that we are forced to conclude the bourgeois 
democratic welfare states are the best we can envisage? Is 
it sadness at the thought that the poor will never get all the 
way out from under the rich, that the solidarity of a co­
operative commonwealth will never be attained? Or is it 
instead sadness at the thought that we intellectuals turned 
out to be less relevant to the fate of humanity than we had 
hoped? Was our thirst for world-historical romance—for 
deep theories about deep causes of social change—caused 
by our concern for human suffering? Or was it at least in 
part a thirst for an important role for ourselves to play?
Whatever the answers to these navel-gazing questions, I 
think that we western leftists can best acknowledge the 
revolutions of 1989 and 1991 by resolving to banalise our 
vocabulary of political deliberation. I suggest that we start 
talking about greed and selfishness rather than about bour­
geois ideology, about starvation wages and layoffs rather
than about the commodification of labour, and about dif­
ferential per-pupil expenditure on schools and differential 
access to health care rather than about the division of 
society into classes. I suggest that we stop assuming that 
the function of the intellectual is radical criticism that at­
tempts to penetrate down to the realities beneath the ap­
pearances. I hope that we can stop using notions like 
'mystification' and 'ideology', notions that suggest that we 
are in a position to see through mere social constructions 
and discern something that is more than a social construc­
tion. It would be better simply to say: perhaps we can 
construct a better society than we have now—better not in 
the sense of conforming better to the way things really are 
but merely in the sense of containing fewer inequities. From 
this point of view, the only kind of criticism of existing 
institutions that will count will be reformist rather than 
radical—the kind that sketches a concrete alternative in­
stitution, an alternative that does not presuppose the exist­
ence of a new kind of human being.
So far, I have been suggesting that we intellectuals should 
react to the recognition that we may always have market 
economies by taking less interest in philosophy and more 
in reform legislation, less interest in academic politics and 
more in electoral politics, less interest in the criticism of 
ideology and more in formulating scenarios for change. But 
I have to admit that something very important has been lost 
now that we can no longer see ourselves as fighting against 
'the capitalist system'. For better or worse, 'socialism' was
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a word that lifted the hearts of the best people who lived in 
our century. A lot of very brave men and women died for 
that word. They died for an idea that turned out not to 
work, but they nevertheless embodied virtues to which 
most of us can hardly aspire.
Still, the image of Lenin at the Finland Station, an image 
that captured the hearts of our grandparents, cannot be 
retouched and revived. That image is, in today's St 
Petersburg, the memory of a nightmare. In the minds of our 
grandchildren, that image will form a triptych along with 
that of Hitler at a Nuremburg rally and of Mussolini on the 
balcony of the Palazzo Venezia. The image of Aleksandr 
Kerensky is going to blend with that of Tom&s Masaryk, 
and that of Hans Beimler with that of Horst Wessel.
So what now will fire the imagination of the international 
Left? What songs will the next generation of hopeful, 
idealistic students sing now that nobody wants the Inter­
national Soviet to be the human race? What cry will rally 
young people who have realised that what their 
grandparents used to call 'the bourgeois revolution' is not 
going to be succeeded by a proletarian revolution? That 
what their grandparents called 'petit-bourgeois reformism' 
is, at least in the industrialised democracies, the only politi­
cal alternative we have left? That revolutions against Third 
World oligarchies are unlikely to throw up any better in­
stitutions than those the industrialised democracies have 
already developed? What heroes and heroines and which 
triumphant events, will fill the minds of the leftist univer­
sity students in 2010?
I have no confident answers to such questions, but I shall 
offer a tentative one: perhaps the image of Lenin will be 
replaced by the image of Vaclav Havel, and the events of 
October 1917 in St Petersburg, by those of 1989 in Prague. 
For of all the revolutions of the past three years, the Velvet 
Revolution best fulfils the intellectual's hope to act together 
with the workers, successfully joining forces to overthrow 
tyrants. Havel's magnificent honesty has made him the 
symbol of everything that Lenin was not. It is not hard to 
hope that Havel's writings will set the tone for the next 
worldwide surge of social hope.
What is so surprising and refreshing about Havel's tone, to 
my mind, is that he seems prepared to go all the way in 
replacing theoretical insight with groundless hope and trial 
and error. As he says in the interviews collected as Disturb­
ing the Peace, "hope is not prognostication". Throughout 
those interviews, he emphasises his lack of interest in un­
derlying forces and historical trends. The following pas­
sage, describing the events of 1967-69, is typical:
Who would have believed—at a time when the 
Novotny regime was corroding away because the 
entire nation was behaving like Schweik—that half a 
year later that same society would display a genuine 
civic-mindedness, and that a year later this recently 
apathetic, sceptical and demoralised society would 
stand up with such courage and intelligence to a 
foreign power! And who would have suspected that, 
after scarcely a year had gone by, this same society
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would, as swiftly as the wind blows, lapse back into 
a state of demoralisation far deeper than its original 
one! After all these experiences, one must be very 
careful about coming to any conclusions about the 
way we are, or what can be expected from us.
'Us' here means 'us Czechs and Slovaks', but what Havel 
is saying works just as well if we take it to mean 'us human 
beings'. We can put Havel's refusal to prognosticate in an 
American context by asking, 'Who would have guessed 
that the white middle class that acknowledged the justice 
of Truman's desegregation of the military, the Supreme 
Court's repudiation of the separate-but-equal doctrine, and 
King's freedom marches, the same white middle class that 
turned King into a schoolbook hero, would now decide that 
it is more important to cut taxes than to immunise ghetto 
children against measles? Who can know whether, a 
decade farther down the road, the same middle class may 
not become disgusted with its own greed and turn against 
the shameless opportunists who have been pandering to 
its selfishness?'
*Havel’s honesty mode him 
the symbol of everything 
that Lenin was not’
Lenin would not have agreed with Havel that we have to 
be "careful about coming to any conclusions about the way 
we are, or what can be expected from us". Scientific 
socialism, Lenin thought, gave us the tools to formulate, 
and demonstrate the truth-of, just such prognostications. 
But the end of leninism will, with luck, rid us of the hope 
for anything like scientific socialism, and for any similar 
source of theoretically-based prognostication.
And yet many of us are still, alas, on the look-out for a 
successor to marxism—for a large theoretical framework 
that will enable us to put our society in an excitingly new 
context. We hope that this new context will suggest some­
thing to say that will be less banal than "people ought to 
be kinder, more generous, less selfish". My own hunch is 
that there may be nothing less banal to say. There may be 
no middle ground between that sort of banality and at­
tempts to sketch concrete, workable alternatives to present 
sociopolitical arrangements. Rather than dreaming of a 
spiritual renewal, I think we would be better off assuming 
that whatever improvements occur in the next century will 
be no more dramatic than those that occurred in ours—that 
the best we can hope for is more of the same experimental, 
hit-or-miss, two-steps-forward-and-one-step-back reforms 
that have been taking place in the industrialised 
democracies since the French Revolution.
RICHARD RORTY is professor of humanities at the Univer­
sity of Virginia, and is author of Philosophy and the Mirror o f 
Nature and Contingency, Irony and Solidarity. This article, an 
extract from a longer essay, was originally published in the 
US monthly Harpers Magazine.
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A more banal
POLITICS?
Peter Beilharz responds that, while a more ordinary 
politics may be a good thing, it still needs to rise to the 
occasion.
R ichard Rorty is one of the most provocative and insightful of con­temporary philosophers—which is to 
say, of course, that by some criteria he 
is not a philosopher at all. He is a vital critic and 
public intellectual. In the age where grand narra­
tives collapse noisily like ageing dinosaurs in the 
jungle, Rorty pursues central social problems in 
a prose that is at once sprightly and clear. No mean 
feat. But do we need more banality in politics?
I find it difficult to disagree with Rorty's claim that we— 
western radicals—need a new political vocabulary. The 
question is, what might it be? Rorty correctly observes that 
the term socialism is completely discredited among citizens 
of the old Soviet Empire. They have a powerful claim to be 
heard, and to be taken seriously. But there are others, in the 
so-called third world and in the deindustrialising parts of 
the first world, who would still hitch their hopes to that star, 
or at least view socialism as a countertrend to the market, 
and they also have a right to be heard, whatever vocabulary 
they use.
Rorty's point here is that fellowtravelling has never been a 
small sin or a passing weakness on the part of leftists. For 
leftists, like everyone else, are suckers for success; and so 
the story that starts with the Red October, travels through 
China, eastern Europe and Cuba is an irresistible path of 
success for radicals who identify socialism's success with 
the achievement of state power.
Into the 1990s, it may be the case that socialism remains a 
defensible tradition or set of traditions, if only the obsession 
with state power is rejected. In Foucault's work, for ex­
ample— or even in that of the French anthropologist L£vi- 
Strauss, there is a sense that marxism is part of our culture; 
perhaps an oppositional moment, but nevertheless part of 
the furniture. Here I stand, I can say no other—Marx for me 
is usually half right, and therefore half wrong. Half full or 
empty, the critical philosophy is not yet ready for the 
junkyard. For marxism speaks a truth about the way the 
world works, about the extraordinary power of the 
economic, about the magical world of commodities. Sorel 
put a similar kind of case at the turn of the previous century, 
when he argued that socialism only made sense in tension 
with and against the everyday reality of capitalism—but it 
was the tension or struggle which mattered. An end to this
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tension would be an end to history, an absolute loss. The 
Sydney philosopher John Anderson argued a similar line 
in the 30s, with his proposition that labour actually needed 
capital because it needed a power to constitute itself 
against. The trouble began, imaginably, when the balance 
was overturned.
The ghost behind various of these cases is that of Hegel. To 
some, Hegel was a crazy system-builder, postmodernism's 
nightmare, part of the problem rather than the solution. But 
as always there are several Hegels or ways to read Hegel. 
The young Marx read Hegel as the theorist of the relation 
between master and slave. Hegel's image made it possible 
for Marx to think class struggle in a double sense— as 
containing a moment which reproduced power as well as 
one which suggested its overthrow. In short, the dialectic 
of master and slave suggested a theory which could ad­
dress both culture and power. Little accident then that this 
particular reading of Hegel became dominant in postwar 
French philosophy, for it made it hypothetically possible to 
address both how pernicious assymetrical relations of 
power could be, and how it was that the subordinate 
partner could help reproduce these relations.
To say this much is one way of confessing that I do not share 
Rorty's sense that we can or ought to junk marxism. Per­
haps his argument makes more sense in the context of 
American culture, where marxism had always been viewed 
as an alien, if not enemy growth and where there are live 
and rich alternatives such as pragmatism. Rorty proposes 
that we now have practically nothing in the way of a 
'theoretical basis' for political action, and that we may not 
in any case need one. This is a useful argument, because it 
puts theory back in its place, but it may also risk jeopard­
ising the idea that criticism is an important practice in itself. 
Rorty proceeds to argue—again I think correctly—that the 
20th century has been a mess partly because intellectuals 
have been too busy filling an invisible queue as would-be 
legislators or heroes. But the logic of his argument is that 
intellectuals should drop not only their bizarre pretensions 
to power, but even perhaps their claims to criticise or to 
influence.
The idea that we should, in our time, seek to make politics 
more ordinary therefore cuts both ways. In one sense 
politics is already so banal as to be anaesthetising. It's true 
that in Australia, for example, Dr Hewson has in mind 
something less than banal, something closer to scorched 
earth, and we can only hope that Australian electors in this 
context will go for the banal. But if we can go beyond that, 
what then of social democratic or liberal prospects? I agree 
with Rorty that there needs to be more talk of health and 
education. These were, indeed, original causes for socialists 
like Owen, Tawney, and the Fabians. Gas and water mat­
ters. But I cannot see how we can do this without talking 
also about ideologies and political visions, not least because 
Rorty is entirely correct to suggest that the whole process 
of reform is so incredibly fragile and contingent. The only 
lesson that history teaches today is that there are no lessons, 
at least as far as the teleological views of Right and Left are 
concerned. Here it is better to return, say, to Croce, with his 
sense that such progress as occurred was always contin­
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gent, for reaction lay always around the corner. Yet all these 
chops and changes rest on ideologies as well as actors.
The middle class is, as Rorty suggests, a major factor in all 
this, if only in the sense that recent charges in welfare policy 
regimes can be traced to changing preferences in middle 
class culture. What this serves to indicate, again, is the 
volatility of ordinary politics. This may well be a condition 
that we're stuck with; Labor in Australia will continually 
reintroduce the health care insurance programs which the 
Liberals will sell off again, and so on. Viewed from a certain 
cynical perspective, this kind of stop-go stuff may simply 
be a cosmetic means of keeping the economy going, just as 
crashing cars helps to keep up GNP indicators. This takes 
us not into banal politics so much as the banality of 
economics.
Richard Rorty's key cue here I take to be the idea that we 
should indeed entertain an ordinary politics, a politics after 
the heroic. None of us, arguably, are very good at doing 
ordinary politics, neither on a national nor transnational, 
regional or local basis. So this is also a positive exhortation, 
that we drop our eyes from the sublime, that we speak more 
of the prose of the world, that we avoid unnecessary 
abstraction in the way we think or speak. This inflection 
would indeed see radical language become more conver­
sational and democratic, and this would be a good thing. 
What makes me twitch is the possible suggestion that there 
could be a singular answer to the question: what then 
should intellectuals do? In the Australian setting there is 
always a risk that intellectuals construct the legitimacy of 
their work by marginalising that of others. 'Leftist' intellec­
tuals should, to my mind, be both reformists and radicals; 
some ought even be revolutionaries, surrealists, poets as 
well as policymakers. In this sense we probably still have 
something to learn even from the cultural and political 
milieu of October. If we are living after communism and 
after the heroic phase of socialism, then the question still 
remains how to create or revive an ordinary politics which 
can rise to the occasion.
PETER BEILHARZ teaches in sociology at Latrobe Univer­
sity. He is author of Labour's Utopias and co-editor of Arguing 
About the Welfare State.
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SUPER
vision
According to its ardent supporters superannuation is one 
of the great political leaps forward. According to its 
increasingly numerous detractors, though, it's a 
misbegotten strategy. We assembled a roundtable 
discussion to explore the issues.
ranees Hamilton is senior co-or­
dinator of Superannuation Trust of 
Australia. Brian Daley is assistant 
federal secretary of the Liquor, 
Hospitality and Miscellaneous Workers Union 
(LHMU). Diana Shaw teaches in sociology at the 
University of NSW. Peter Davidson is a research 
officer for the Australian Council of Social Ser­
vice (ACOSS). The discussion was chaired by Les 
Fallick, from the speakers office of the ACT 
Legislative Assembly.
The increasing priority given to retirement savings since 
the mid-1980s has tended to be traced to the demographic 
influence of the baby-boomers, and what is called the 
dependency ratio. Brian, what is meant by the depend­
ency ratio, and why is it perceived to be a problem?
Brian: The dependency ratio is the population of 65 and 
over as a percentage of those aged between 15 and 64. It 
was 14.8% in 1980, is expected to be 17.5% in the year 2000 
and 32.1% in 2040. In other words, the population is ageing. 
By about the year 2025, the number of people aged over 65 
increases to around 35% of the population. At the same time 
there is also a decrease in the number of children in the 
population—a factor that's often overlooked. Because they 
are not income earners, of course, children are dependent 
on those who are income earners, in the same way that 
those over 65 are to some extent dependent on those who 
are in the taxation system.
Frances: It's also to do with the fact that people are living 
a lot longer, so that in fact the period of retirement is much 
greater than it was even 20 years ago.
Peter: I'd argue, however, that the impact on government 
spending Of this trend has been overstated, and that we 
need to take into account the probability that in future
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people will be working at least part-time for a longer 
period. And because the age pension system is targeted 
towards people with little other income, the cost of continu­
ing with the present age pension system has also been 
overstated. The Economic Planning Advisory Council es­
timated a few years ago that the total increase in age 
pension and other related health and social welfare costs 
would be in the vicinity of 2-3% of GNP over the next 40 
years. T h at's  w orth  w orrying about, but it 's  not 
catastrophic for government revenues, provided there are 
adequate revenue sources.
When I say to people overseas that the Australian trade 
union movement has pursued a big superannuation in­
crease in the 1980s, they don't really know what I'm 
talking about. How would the problem of ageing normal­
ly be tackled in the European social democracies?
Frances: There's been a mixed response overseas. In Europe 
much of retirement income is funded through the taxation 
system. There is a levy on the people in employment and 
the people who need it receive it not on the basis of work 
performed, but simply by virtue of being citizens of the 
country. So women, for instance, who have not been in paid 
full-time work all their life, wouldn't receive less than 
people who did have paid work.
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Why haven't we gone for a comprehensive social in­
surance system based on taxation?
Frances: Unfortunately I don't think it was politically or 
socially feasible back in the 1980s to organise it that way, 
because it would have implied increasing taxes. What was 
chosen was the only way it could be done at the time.
Brian: At that time we were massively deregulating all 
sorts of institutions and to move to a funded pension 
arrangement which would have involved the government 
as a regulator in a substantial way was against the general 
direction and attitude of government.
Diana: There was also a strong push from the state to 
increase domestic savings because balance of payments 
problems were developing. There was a feeling that in­
creasing occupational superannuation could create a new 
pool of domestic savings.
To a degree the super push also arose out of the wages 
system. How did that come about?
Brian: In the early 1980s, as part of a wages claim, the 
building unions had sought an allowance payment, which 
had been refused by the National Wage Case bench. They 
hit upon the idea of getting employers to pay the equivalent 
of that wage increase into a superannuation scheme. What 
sprang from that, however, was the realisation that super­
annuation was something which the union movement 
should seek to involve itself in, for a broad range of social 
reasons. There was, as Diana says, a national savings pool 
to be controlled and to be developed, and there are sig­
nificant infrastructure and development issues the work­
ing-class movement could have a say in.
Have other countries successfully taken this route? Will 
it lead to a comprehensive retirement income solution?
Diana: The system we've developed here is unique, so it's 
very difficult to say. In Sweden, the government established 
wage-earner funds where employers contributed into a 
collective fund, and the investment was then going to 
benefit workers collectively. But those funds didn't really 
tie into benefits for individual workers in the way the 
Australian system has been set up to do.
Brian: Australia also has a much more mobile workforce 
than most other countries. We don't have the concept of 
lifetime employment that the Japanese and a number of 
European countries have, which have tended to facilitate 
single-employer superannuation schemes, and therefore 
perhaps make the funding of other social security schemes 
easier.
Peter. One of the unfortunate things about the develop­
ment of superannuation policy in the 1980s is that it has 
been cobbled together as we've gone along, and the goals 
set later on to justify the policy. Although I think we've gone 
too far down the track of occupational super to go back, 
there are a number of different ways of structuring that 
system which haven't really been explored or even publicly
debated. It's just assumed that the age pension will potter 
along at around 25% of average earnings—which is a very 
low rate compared with other OECD nations—and that 
employers will contribute up to 9% of wages in super. 
There's been no exploration of the possibilities of raising 
the age pension a little, or of devoting some of those retire­
ment savings to other purposes which are needed by 
people on low incomes throughout their lives. They're 
much more likely to become unemployed, to need retrain­
ing and to suffer poverty if they become ill.
Brian: Given the drift of demography that we've already 
acknowledged, I don't believe that we'll see any govern­
ment take the decision to create a comprehensive tax-based 
social insurance scheme in the next decade or beyond.
Diana: But the vast majority of the population are not going 
to accumulate a significant amount in their superannuation 
funds, and so there is still going to be a large proportion of 
the population which will be totally dependent on the age 
pension, or at least a top-up of the age pension. So there are 
going to be people who will be demanding that political 
parties look at the age pension.
Brian: I don't think that's going to happen. Part of the 
theory behind the current model is to increase the real value 
of the pension in the long-run. The aim is to provide a 
sufficient retirement income to effectively take many 
people out of need for the pension system. But you can only 
do that once you've got the demographics working your 
way. Once you start to decrease the number of people who 
rely on the pension, both in percentage and in real terms, 
then you can start to focus on the problem of being able to 
increase its real value.
Diana: Another area which hasn't been adequately dis­
cussed is the possibility of redistributing income so that the 
inequalities of people in their working lives could perhaps 
be changed somewhat in retirement. Because the system is 
set up on an earnings-related model it means that if you 
have a poor time of it during your years in the workforce, 
you're going to have a pretty awful time of it in retirement 
too.
Peter The Australian age pension system, because of its 
low rates and its income and asset tests, is one of the 
cheapest in the OECD. I really don't think there's a serious 
cost problem with a moderate increase in the age pension. 
The cost of the tax concessions for occupational super is 
already almost half the annual cost of the age pension, and 
will increase over the years. If we're concerned about the 
efficiency of government spending, whether it's going to 
those who need it and whether it's actually boosting na­
tional savings, then the tax concessions for occupational 
super fall down on both counts. A large proportion of those 
concessions are going to people who don't need them to 
subsidise their retirement incomes and they're going to 
people who are going to save in other forms anyway. 
According to the Treasury figures a person on three times 
average weekly earnings now gets a retirement income 
subsidy worth roughly three times that which a person on 
half of the average weekly earnings gets, and that includes 
the age pension. That's outrageous.
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Frances: I was surprised at the extent to which both the 
Government and the Opposition had taken notice of 
ACOSS's views on tax concessions. They've both cut out 
concessions for employees, although they're there for self- 
employed people, and they are both trying to slot in a 
tighter system of tax concessions on employer contribu­
tions. So my impression is that they are actually trying to 
be fairer on this.
Brian: It's important to realise the numbers involved in 
expanding the pension system. A two per cent increase in 
the share of GDP going to the pension system would add 
about another $7 billion to the government deficit before 
you've even touched the size of the pension. By increasing 
the pension from 25% of average weekly earnings to 35%— 
a figure that's commonly mentioned—you would probably 
treble the budget deficit. I can't imagine that there will be a 
government brave enough to do that for the sake of social 
security expenditure.
‘Increasing the pension to 
35% of overage earnings 
would treble the budget 
deficit’
We're changing the superannuation system from a volun- 
taristic one based on tax concessions to a compulsory one. 
We've talked about the merits of that. The next logical 
question seems to be how much money we are accumulat­
ing, and who controls it.
Frances: It's growing very rapidly now, especially since the 
introduction of the Superannuation Guarantee Charge 
(SGC), which provides that every employee in Australia— 
not just people covered by awards—are to get at least three 
per cent put aside for them for super. It's more likely to be 
around $400 billion by 2000. That money is being invested 
by the trustees of the various funds—half employer-ap- 
pointed and half employee-appointed—with the advice of 
the investment experts, who mainly come from the in­
surance industry.
Why would an employer be on the fund's trustees if 
workers are the contributors?
Frances: Because company funds were traditionally 
employer funds, the employers have always in some sense 
believed that it's their money, even though once it's in the 
funds it belongs to the member. The employers still have a 
very strong sense of their rights to direct where this money 
goes. And in fact that has always been accepted as fair. It 
was interesting to see the Law Reform Commission ques­
tion exactly this point, and they're not exactly regarded as 
a radical organisation.
We've got some notion of who controls the money. Have 
We got any notion of what we should be doing with it?
Peter: There's not much point boosting national savings if 
they're not being invested in the economic development of 
Australia, both in the interests of the nation, and in the 
interests of fund members directly—because their returns 
depend very much on domestic economic growth. There's 
an ongoing debate as to whether government has a role in 
directing investment, given their contribution through tax 
concessions. My feeling is that it's a blunt instrument, and 
perhaps those arguments put the cart before the horse. If 
the tax concessions weren't so excessive in the first place, 
then the government would have the money itself to invest 
as it wished.
Playing the devil's advocate for a moment, as a potential 
retiree with money in super, there would seem to be three 
possible directions for that money: I could give it to the 
government and hope that there's a good rate of return in 
infrastructure; I could give the money to a private invest­
ing agency like an insurance company or a firm of inves­
tors to invest willy-nilly; or I could invest through my 
trustees in the economic development of Australia. It 
seems to me that I would be as happy living off the 
products of rentier capitalism, invested all around the 
world, as I would be off Australian infrastructure. I would 
want the highest rate of return whether it's in government 
infrastructure, Australian investment or Rio Tinto Zinc. 
Would that not be a valid argument?
Diana: You might not be very concerned about where your 
money's going, but if your children are never going to work 
in this country because there are no jobs, then you might 
think quite differently. One solution would be to find some 
model whereby low income earners' money is invested in 
very secure blue-chip securities and maybe as you have a 
higher income invested in superannuation, some of your 
money can go to socially responsible investment. The im­
portant thing is to have some investment to create employ­
ment-generating opportunities in Australia.
Brian: In the early stages of industry super we had to make 
an assessment about what to do with the money. We had to 
deliver a com petitive in terest rate, otherw ise the 
marketplace may well have devoured us, and that's 
probably taken us down a path of very traditional invest­
ment models.
Peter There's also a direct impact on working people if 
governments don't have the money to provide services. 
Retirement living standards depend on a great deal more 
than income. They will increasingly depend on access to 
health-care services, so that you can live at home and be 
more active in the community for longer; and on the ability 
to re-educate or retrain yourself to make a career change 
later in life. All of these things are services provided by 
government. One of my worries is that if too much govern­
ment money is invested in retirement incomes only, then 
governments in future are going to ask retirees to pay for 
these services which are currently provided free or at low 
cost. So people may be wealthier in income, but they'll have 
a lot of other expenses.
If we want to increase people's access to their savings, 
what should they be able to use them for?
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Peter: In the battle to increase national savings clear that 
people earning less than average earnings are the ones not 
saving at the moment. The fact is that they generally can't 
afford to save. So if they're going to be forced to save, then 
it has to be for purposes which will really benefit them. It's 
hardly in the interests of low-income earners who have just 
purchased a house, just had children, and rely on one 
income, to be putting aside money for retirement. They 
need it now. If someone on a lower wage suddenly finds 
themselves unemployed, they also need the money now. 
There is a problem with giving people early access to 
savings which are tax-assisted. It has to be very carefully 
structured, so that there are only limited purposes for 
which people can call upon the money—and I suspect it 
ought to have been saved for a certain period of time before 
it attracts a tax-concession. But it's really not in the interests 
of low-wage earners to make their contribution to the 
national savings effort if the system isn't more flexible and 
tailored to their needs.
Frances: I agree with Peter on this. When a person retires, 
that person must have a secure home to live in, and some 
income. In fact the ACTU has a policy that every member 
of a fund should be able to take out a sum of money after a 
certain number of years of membership to use as a deposit 
on their house. That money isn't a loan as such, because if 
and when the house is sold, a certain amount of money 
comes back to the fund, plus a proportion of any profit. 
How does any low-paid worker, certainly in the large 
capital cities, ever get the deposit on a house? This is an 
ideal way to do it, via the super system.
Peter A lot of them can't afford it, and that's why I think 
access needs to extend beyond the home loans.
The single greatest contributor to poverty for retirees is 
not owning their own home, is it not?
Peter That's correct. Something like 55% of people on the 
full pension are non-homeowners. It would be a politically 
popular decision to make home loans or deposit loans 
available through super and because of that governments 
of any persuasion will probably do something along those 
lines. But I must admit I have a mixed reaction to it. It has 
the potential, as we've seen with a lot of retirees, to make 
them asset-rich and income-poor, and I'm not sure that 
that's necessarily in their interests. It also helps to abrogate 
the government's responsibility for public housing. I'm 
concerned that we'll see the government move away from 
socially desirable housing projects and developments, and 
they'll use the income from superannuation funds as a 
means of doing that.
Frances suggested that we would have up to $400 billion 
in superannuation funds accumulated by the year 2000. 
From my rough recollection of the amount of shares 
traded on the Australian stock exchange, that would 
mean that the superannuation funds could buy all of 
those shares and have money left over.
Brian: Companies can issue enough equity to absorb ten 
times over the demand from super funds. The individual
superannuation funds won't regularly own more than 
around 10-20% of companies.
The superannuation industry has always had a horrible 
vision of a backroom meeting at the ACTU where in­
dustry fund X,Y and Z got together and said, we've each 
got 30% of BHP, that means we own it. Why shouldn't or 
wouldn't that happen?
Diana: If it meant that you got more accountability in some 
of these publicly-listed companies that could only be a 
good thing. In Britain, there are quite a number of pension 
funds which are now making demands that the directors 
of public companies be more accountable. Funds have 
recently called the boards of directors to account for giving 
themselves hefty wage-rises at a time when the rest of the 
workforce is having to adopt wage restraint. So these active 
interventions by superannuation funds could only be a 
good thing, surely.
‘It’s hardly in the interests of 
low-income earners to be 
putting aside money for 
retirement.’
The notion of corporate citizenship has come onto the 
agenda after the excesses of the 1980s. If you look at the 
UK and America, ethics in business is a big movement. 
Charities, universities, consumer groups, want to see how 
they can use their investment power to influence their 
companies. I remember as a student 20 years ago fighting 
to ensure that the university took its money out of South 
Africa. But we're talking about billions of dollars now. 
Surely now we don't need to ask them to change their 
behaviour, we have the power of dictating to them.
Peter: I don't think such a thing is likely to happen by 
stealth. There would be a huge political struggle around it, 
involving the international as well as national markets. If a 
bit more accountability and democracy are achieved, then 
that's good, but I don't think it'll get very far without major 
political change.
Brian: That's right. One of the focuses of the Coalition's 
policy now is to try to downgrade superannuation, and it's 
partly because of their concerns about what the future 
holds.
The trade unions and the community in general have 
been on a steep learning curve about retirement incomes 
and superannuation. Entering this field has had a big 
effect on our culture and our views. But what effect has it 
had on the traditional providers, the AMP, National 
Mutual and so on? Has their culture changed?
Frances: It has to some extent, although not enough. A lot 
of it is token gestures. I suppose we can be arrogant enough
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to say that we have influenced them to decide that trade 
unionists and workers actually have brains, and that they 
care about many of the same things that insurance com­
panies care about—although not all.
I think we need to pursue this question of ownership and 
control. Despite their rhetoric about individuals taking 
back control of their lives, there's nothing in the Liberals' 
policy as democratic as the way in which the develop­
ments of the last seven years have opened up superan­
nuation. B efore the recent developm ents, 
superannuation was something that the employer gave 
to you as a gift, and it was something you knew nothing 
about and certainly didn't have any control over.
Brian: The Coalition's policy is in fact entirely regressive. 
The Coalition would put absolute limits on superannua­
tion now, and would do their best to unwind what has been 
done so far. The Liberals' policy is really one of stopping 
the average person improving their lifestyle and their rela­
tive income position, which superannuation has the poten­
tial to do.
Diana: That's one of the reasons why we have to be very 
clear about identifying that employees have a share of the 
action in industry funds, because the trustees of industry 
funds are in fact directly representing the employees. If we 
move towards a system where the superannuation funds 
are run by the banks, there will be no accountability for the 
employees in the funds.
Diana: One thing we haven't talked about is that women 
continue to be seriously disadvantaged in this system. 
Because the system is earnings-related and dependent 
upon how long you're in the workforce, the fact that 
women are always in the lower sectors of the workforce 
and tend to have broken patterns of employment means 
that women will never accumulate a sufficient amount of 
money for their retirement. So we've got to be demanding 
that the government look at some way either to give graded 
tax benefits for the first 10 years of employment, or some 
other means of addressing the inequity of women in super­
annuation.
Brian: Don't you think that some aspects of a family model, 
and I use the word loosely, are now underlying part of the 
government philosophy?
Diana: Yes, but that sort of family model is not the model 
that most Australians live under now.
Brian: I take the point that there are some single women 
who bear children and leave the workforce, and they are 
an increasing group, but there is still a large percentage of 
single people who don't leave the workforce. And within 
the family model there is now much more accountability 
on equality in divorce.
Diana: But the amount of money the woman is going to 
get on retirement is still going to be precious little.
Brian: I don't disagree that the model is loaded somewhat 
towards males, and not just somewhat, but I think we 
should also acknowledge that we have come a fair way 
towards redressing some of the imbalance.
Diana: In the past women didn't get anything.
Frances: I know from my own experience. I was out of the 
fulltime workforce for seven years and then came back in 
my 40s, with no super at all. Women previously had noth­
ing, unless they were tied to a man who lived as long as 
they did or who left them a certain amount of money. 
Women will work more during their working lives, and 
will earn more, but they'll never make it up completely. 
The only way is to make sure that the age pension is 
subsidised properly to allow for the fact that women have 
worked throughout their lives, though not necessarily in 
paid work, let alone well-paid work. The pension system 
has to be kept viable and with a structure that builds up 
the money for the people who actually still need it. And 
they'll be women.
There's an attempt by the industry at the moment to blur 
the distinction between industry funds and general 
products that they're bringing on to the market. These 
general products, which they are portraying as offering 
freedom of choice, in fact offer you the ability to sign 
away whatever ownership and control you've got.
Frances: The argum ent about freedom of choice is 
ridiculous anyway. The Opposition like to imply that 
freedom of choice means freedom of choice for the member. 
When you question them, it turns out that what they really 
mean is freedom of choice for employers to decide where 
they will put the money. For instance, the state government 
of NSW slotted specific legislation on freedom of choice of 
superannuation fund into their industrial relations act
That would mean, would it not, that an employer who is 
making a compulsory contribution can decide which 
fund to make that contribution to, whereas the model 
promoted by the ACTU argues that the fund that the 
employer should contribute to should be specified? That 
is, it should be an industry fund.
Frances: Yes, and there are very good reasons why this 
should be so. An employee changes jobs six times in a 
lifetime on average, and the idea is that an employee will 
have an account throughout their working life into which 
the superannuation payments will be made. From the 
employer's point of view, they want to write out one 
cheque every month for superannuation to the industry 
fund. So the whole idea of freedom of choice from the 
employer point of view is crazy, because the employer is 
not going to write 100 or 1,000 superannuation cheques 
every month.
Brian: Freedom of choice is a really dangerous marketing 
tool at the moment. At present a number of institutions are 
coming up with some very slick marketing campaigns 
which do not disclose fees or the range of costs. People end 
up buying what is really an inferior product.
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Conservatives and
RADICALS
Australian conservatives traditionally lauded stability, 
custom and tradition. The neo-liberals of the federal 
Coalition are after radical change, and nothing will stand 
in their way. Stuart Macintyre looks at the remarkable 
transformation of the contemporary Right.
A t the heart of contem porary  A u stralian  conservatism  lies a profound uncertainty: just what is to 
be conserved? Conservatives have 
conventionally resisted radical change and af­
firmed the importance of custom and tradition. 
Now, with certain conspicuous exceptions, they 
want us to break with the past and start anew. 
Conservatives have traditionally celebrated the 
national achievement and defended the core in­
stitutions of public life. Now, while still cham­
pioning our absentee monarch, Elizabeth  
Windsor, they turn their backs on history and 
damn what has gone before.
The federal Coalition's Fightback! manifesto sketches an 
attenuated account of the national predicament that has 
induced this iconoclasm. Its economic comparisons of then 
with now seldom go back further than 1983, and a discreet 
silence is maintained over the period before that when 
John Howard was advised by John Hewson in the manage­
ment of the national economy. But there is a brief historical 
sketch that introduces analysis, in Chapter Two, of The 
Roots o f National Decline. Here we find a statement that 
purports to explain how it all went wrong.
It begins a hundred years ago when Australia was the 
richest country in the world. That starting-point is taken 
as given with no indication of the circumstances or condi­
tions of our good fortune. Then came the Depression of the 
1890s "with its bank failures and great strikes"—again, 
they are simply noted with no suggestion of why they 
occurred. In response, those who created the new Com­
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monwealth of Australia "were determined that the 
economic and social turmoil of that decade would never 
again be inflicted on Australians". Hence the introduction 
of tariff protection and industrial arbitration. "Tariff 
protection was meant to ensure that companies could af­
ford to pay a 'just' wage while industrial arbitration was 
meant to guarantee that they did so." These, with the White 
Australia Policy and an extension of industrial assistance 
to rural producers in the form of subsidies, amounted to a 
system of "protection all round" that reinforced our isola­
tion from the rest of the world. Here it is not the cause but 
the effect that is unproblematic: "We didn't know then 
what is glaringly apparent now: that it was inculcating a 
low productivity and inward-looking culture and steadily 
eroding the basis of our prosperity."
Every generation tends to condescend to its predecessors, 
but that last statement is simply and unequivocally wrong. 
The national economic strategy that Fightback! summarises 
as "protection all round" was the subject of searching
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criticism and keen debate from the 1920s onwards. The 
emergent economics profession of this country cut its teeth 
on the problem s of excessive protection. Bankers, 
politicians, academics, public affairs commentators—all 
warned repeatedly during the interwar years that 
Australia had to set its house in order and live within its 
means. These critics appreciated what the authors of 
Fightback! show no signs of appreciating—that this 
strategy was deeply rooted in Australian experiences, that 
it expressed social as well as economic aspirations, and 
that any alternative strategy needed to heed the lessons of 
the past.
Let us go back to that golden age when Australians enjoyed 
a uniquely high standard of living, before the disasters of 
the 1890s. It is indeed true that the Australian economy 
achieved impressive growth and a high per capita national 
income during the 19th century. It did so on the basis of an 
international trade in basic commodities, notably wool and 
minerals. These were produced more efficiently and 
profitably than rival producers because Australian 
producers enjoyed some crucial advantages.
First, they had free access to a plentiful supply of a crucial 
factor of production, land (whose indigenous inhabitants 
were forcibly expropriated) and the mineral resources 
under the land's surface. Second, they were showered with 
support by the world's leading economic power, Britain. 
British capital and labour flowed into the Australian 
colonies because British manufacturers were prepared to 
pay high prices for these export commodities; if today we 
lament our exclusion from the leading trading blocs, we 
were then part of the dominant one. Third, it was possible 
on the 'greenfield site' of the Australian colonies to practise 
the most advanced forms of enterprise. While the primary 
sectors of other economies were hamstrung by restrictive 
relations of production— rapacious landlords, im­
poverished tenants practising semi-subsistence patterns of 
cultivation—here we moved immediately to wage labour 
and sp ecia lised  prod uction  for the m arket. Our 
woolgrowers, and later our wheat farmers, produced at a 
lower unit price.
If all this warms the hearts of the economic rationalists, 
then it is all to the good that those organs get some much- 
needed exercise; but there were further features of the 19th 
century success story. First of all, this was a high-wage 
economy. Indeed, the development of the domestic sector, 
the manufacturing and service industries, relied on the 
high level of demand made possible by consumer demand. 
Australians were buying convenience food and ready­
made clothing, they were purchasing homes and engaging 
in commercial leisure industries well ahead of their 
European counterparts because they enjoyed high real 
wages. Second, the state played a vital role in this economy. 
It provided the bulk of the productive and social infrastruc­
ture—the transport, the utilities, the schools, the amenities. 
Half of the capital formation of the 19th century was public 
sector capital formation. Moreover, the state augmented 
the labour force with assisted migration schemes and was 
itself an important employer. Third, this economy relied 
heavily on foreign borrowing, and increasingly so after 
1850 when the conditions of natural resource exploitation
became heavily capital intensive while the absence of 
financial controls allowed rampant speculation.
It all came crashing down when a downturn in export 
prices triggered a sharp contraction of domestic activity. 
The bank failures and the great strikes of the 1890s were 
two sides of the same coin: Australia's openness to the 
world economy meant that it had no defence against the 
withdrawal of investment, while the export producers 
pinned all their hopes on a reduction of costs at the expense 
of labour. The misery and the violence of that decade 
appalled Australians, not least because they threatened the 
aspirations to national self-sufficiency and national unity 
that the newly federated Commonwealth of Australia was 
meant to secure. Hence the introduction of the protective 
measures— the tariff, the system of industrial arbitration 
and wage determination, the immigration controls.
Fightback! sees these devices as isolating Australia from the 
rest of the world, lowering productivity and encouraging 
an inward-looking culture because they reduced competi­
tiveness. Let us be clear about the limits of this system of 
protection. It regulated the inflows of labour and manufac­
tured goods. It placed a floor under labour costs. It gave 
some encouragement to export diversification by assisting 
with the production and marketing of new farm products. 
This was hardly a system of "protection all round", nor 
could it be. Over two crucial determinants of Australian 
economic performance, export income and investment, 
there was very little control. The first depended on the level 
of demand and prices paid for commodity exports, and 
these variables became increasingly fickle as other national 
economies developed their own primary industries. As for 
the second, governments had very little control over 
private investment or financial institutions until World 
War Two, while their capacity to borrow in order to as­
semble the public infrastructure depended on the willing­
ness of lenders to make those funds available.
Australia, in short, remained an open trading economy 
highly vulnerable to external shocks. The purpose of 
protecting local industries was to give some security of 
employment; the function of arbitration and wage deter­
mination was to allow the necessary adjustment to sudden 
falls in national income without ruinous class conflict The 
system could not insulate the national economy but it was 
meant to provide it with shock absorbers. And during the 
first three-quarters of this century the record is far from 
disastrous. Australia did achieve growth; the principal 
commodity producers remained highly efficient; there was 
increase in the per capita national income; wage levels 
rose; inequality was less marked and employment held up 
better than in most advanced economies; and when the 
great world depression of the 1930s struck, Australia es­
caped the worst of the social and political convulsions that 
destroyed democracy elsewhere. In short, this was—and 
still is—a good country in which to live.
No one would claim it could not be better, or that there 
were no missed opportunities. The very formation of the 
economics profession in the 1920s signalled a growing 
dissatisfaction with the national economic performance, 
and introduced a new way of analysing institutions and
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debating public policy. Again, the readiness of Fightback! to 
dismiss the past blinds it to the complexities of these issues. 
The economists who investigated the effects of the tariff at 
the end of the 1920s could see that it had failed to foster 
efficient, com petitive m anufacturing industries in 
Australia. The failure of the manufacturers to achieve ex­
port sales was evidence of that, and their restriction to a 
small domestic market trapped them in a cycle of inefficient 
practices and increased tariff levels. They noted also that 
the collusion of the unions with the employers in this use 
of tariff protection allowed wage increases without in­
creases in productivity, and thus imposed a higher cost 
structure on the rest of the economy.
‘This is a bizarre version of 
the creation of a settier 
society '
But not even the most deregulatory of these critics enter­
tained the notion that you could solve the problem along 
the lin es proposed in Fightback! They understood 
Australia's options in terms of competitive advantage. 
Australia enjoyed an advantage as a producer of a narrow 
band of commodities; it was at a significant disadvantage 
in terms of distance, size, technological and capital depend­
ency in the production of most other traded goods. The 
trick they sought to bring off was to use the advantages to 
build and diversify the economy, reduce its dependence 
and lead it on the path to industrialisation, while at the 
same time avoiding the imposition of too great a burden on 
its core staples. This was a task that necessarily required a 
national economic policy implemented through institu­
tions that defined and regulated the operation of capital, 
labour and product markets. The challenge here was to 
ensure that the institutions served the strategy and were 
not captured for the short-term advantage of particular 
economic interest groups.
This, in brief, was the economists' understanding of the 
possibilities back then. If, by some timewarp, the Fightback! 
package had been im plem ented at that tim e, the 
woolgrowers might have increased their returns through 
cheaper inputs, but most other industries would have 
withered as a result of export competition and the reduced 
income levels of domestic consumers. There would have 
been even less incentive for capital, technology and labour 
transfers into a distant, backward and polarised country of 
rich landowners and impoverished urban dwellers.
Leaving aside the economic objections to such a scorched- 
earth policy, earlier generations of conservatives had other 
reasons for pausing before they dismantled what had been 
so laboriously constructed. Above all, they appreciated that 
Australia was a democracy in which citizenship had a 
social dimension. There was an expectation among the 
Wage-earning majority that all were entitled to benefit from 
the national wealth. All, in this context, tended to mean the
white adult males organised through the trade unions and 
the Labor Party, and the benefits favoured the male bread­
winner. But the expectation that work should be available 
at satisfactory wage levels was a powerful force, and the 
public institutions that served that expectation had consid­
erable political durability. When Prime Minister Bruce 
panicked in the face of mounting economic difficulties in 
the late 1920s and coupled an assault on wages with a threat 
to dismantle the arbitration system, he was turned out of 
office. Malcolm Fraser's threat to arbitration on the eve of 
the 1983 election proved equally unsuccessful.
Both conservatives and liberals sometimes wondered if 
democracy was consistent w ith sensible econom ic 
decision-making, if the state had not been subjected to too 
many demands; but in the end they had to accept 
democracy and the constraints it imposed. The operation 
of the market had to allow for social needs. If economics 
claimed to offer a scientific analysis of different means to 
given ends, then the means had to allow for the popular 
expectations expressed through the political system.
One searches Fightback! in vain for an acknowledgment of 
these complexities. There is no suggestion that the present- 
day conservatives are heirs to a political tradition from 
which they might derive an appreciation of their difficul­
ties. Apart from a ritual gesture to Sir Robert Menzies, there 
is no mention of previous leaders such as Deakin who 
sought to define the responsibilities of the state in ways that 
could reconcile economic and social objectives; no aware­
ness of the contribution made by practical intellectuals such 
as Eggleston to the shaping of the Australian political 
economy.
The nearest Fightback! comes to considering the problem 
comes in a closing flourish to the third chapter, under the 
slogan 'Australia Can Do It'. Here we are told that the 
Coalition's commitment to individual choice and private 
enterprise is one that derives from our own history.
The story of Australia has been the story of an arid 
continent becoming one of the world's greatest 
breadbaskets, feeding millions in other lands. The 
story of mining in Australia is of dedicated pioneers 
defying odds and expectations to build a world-beat- 
ing industry. The best stories of sporting Australia 
are of shy heroes who haven't let fame go to their 
heads.
The greatest assets which our country has are the 
values which have been passed down by generations 
of Australians who came to this land seeking 
freedom, opportunities and self-respect for themsel­
ves and their families. These are not the values of 
some historic past. They are values of enduring im­
portance to all Australians, and the task of govern­
ments is to make sure that they can be given full play.
This is an interesting appropriation of national history. It 
begins with the transformation of arid land (whose arid 
land?) into farmland, and passes over the processes that 
involved—the dispossession of its original inhabitants, the 
creation by the state of property rights, the special legisla­
tion that assisted farmers to take up farms, the provision
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by the state of roads and railways and port facilities, not to 
mention the schools, hospitals and other social infrastruc­
ture of these bush settlements, the tribulations of farm life 
and the long-term effects on the environment. Similarly, the 
story of mining is not a story at all—where is the argument 
over mineral rights, the creation of the legal framework for 
the mining company, the regulation of mining conditions, 
the turbulent industrial relations of the industry? In both 
of these key export industries, a mythical hero is con­
structed, the dedicated pioneer, and endowed with the 
qualities of a sporting hero.
From this imaginative reading of the past Fightback! derives 
the values of freedom, opportunity and self-respect that 
successive generations supposedly brought to Australia 
and passed down through their families. Again this is a 
bizarre version of what was involved in the creation of a 
settler society. The first settlers had no say in the matter at 
all, having been sentenced to transportation by British 
courts. The subsequent waves of immigration were or­
chestrated by colonial and later Commonwealth officials 
who repeatedly complained at the poor material they were 
forced to accept. Their reception was a recurrent cause of 
conflict. Their family formation was the result of active 
state intervention. The freedom, opportunities and self- 
respect they sought were never a matter of consensual 
agreement. Insofar as they achieved these objectives, they 
relied on the machinery of Australian social democracy, the 
public framework that Fightback! dismisses.
Fightback! constructs this mythohistorical national past in 
order to establish the existence of energies it proposes to 
release:
Above all else, the program put forward in this docu­
ment is aimed at giving Australians the chance to 
show what they can do when the official, the 
regulator and the taxman get off their backs, and 
when they are once more guaranteed rewards for 
their achievements and opportunities for the taking.
It is a program based on trust and regard for the 
individuals and the families, the farms and the busi­
nesses, the teachers and the scientists, who hold the 
destiny of this great country in their hands.
But against this confident view of the national character is 
set the document's gloomy account of the roots of the 
national decline. In its own words, "Australia's history for 
the best part of a century, is a chronicle of missed chances." 
Our system of "protection all round" we are told has 
resulted in an "inward-looking culture" that now has to be 
reversed.
There is much that might be said about the origins of this 
"inw ard-looking cu ltu re". The forms assumed by 
Australian nationalism in the early part of the century were 
often insular and mistrustful of the outside world. The 
White Australia Policy closed the door to Asian and Pacific 
island migration; the establishment of the Australian 
defence forces expressed a regional fear of neighbours to 
the north; the ready support for Britain in the war that
began in Europe in 1914 was a premium on the imperial 
insurance policy. But if we were to trace the growing isola­
tion of Australia, we would need to note the way that 
Australian conservatives clung to the imperial protector 
long after Britain's own decline became apparent. They 
insisted on an imperial preference trade policy; they kept 
our schools and universities, churches and professions as 
imitative as possible. They denounced all exotic influen­
ces—from American films to modernist art—as degenerate 
and dangerous. They prohibited the import of literature 
and forbade the entry of dangerous foreigners. They held 
Australia in a condition of dependence— economic, 
strategic, social and cultural dependence—from which it 
has yet to fully emerge.
But rather than argue over responsibility for this state of 
affairs, it is more useful to note the form in which it is 
described: an "inward-looking culture". Culture has be­
come an increasingly popular term in the Coalition lexicon. 
If you listen to Dr Hewson talking about how the country 
needs to be "turned around", you will usually hear some 
reference to the new 'culture' that has to encourage 
enterprise and wealth creation. 'Culture' here is an up­
market synonym for attitudes. Fightback! tells us insistently 
that "As much as a fundamental change in policy direction, 
Australia needs a change of attitudes".
It's an odd admission for an economic liberal. According to 
their own theory of human behaviour, society is simply an 
agglomeration of rational, calculating individuals, each 
seeking to maximise personal advantage. If you remove the 
regulations and protective devices that hinder the efficient 
allocation of resources, and scrap the opportunities for free 
loading and bludging that stifle enterprise, then according 
to this theory all of us will automatically behave as acquisi­
tive profit-maximisers. Attitudes, according to this 
utilitarian calculus, are simply habits, responses to stimuli: 
create the right incentives and the appropriately competi­
tive behaviour will follow.
The admission that policies alone will not work and that 
changed attitudes are also necessary signals the limits of 
economic liberalism. The authors of Fightback! sense that 
it's not quite as simple as their economic program suggests, 
that Australians are attached to forms of behaviour that 
defy this primitive view of human nature. Perhaps they 
sense also that a nation is more than a business enterprise, 
that politics involves more than economics, and that there 
are values embedded in Australian society that resist the 
logic of the market. Perhaps in time they will appreciate 
that a culture is not a collection of non-economic residuals 
that you can change at will. They might even come to 
understand the deep historical roots of our flawed but far 
from contemptible social democracy.
STUART MACINTYRE is professor of history at Melbourne 
University. This was originally published in Markets, 
M orals and M anifestos: Fightback! and the P olitics o f  
Economic Rationalism in the 1990s, published by the In­
stitute for Science and Technology Policy, Murdoch Univer­
sity, 199Z It is reproduced here with permission.
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We want you 
to be part 
of us
Over the latter part of this year, ALR will be 
undergoing some big changes: a new design, new 
features and content, and perhaps even a new name. 
It’s all part of our ‘Plan For Growth’, because we think what 
ALR is trying to do is too important to be confined to the select 
band of our current loyal readers and subscribers.
But all of this will require money, and ALR’s current resources are slim 
indeed. So, as a vital part of our ‘plan for growth’, we will be offering a 
stake in the magazine to our readers and supporters. We want you to play 
a real and important role in the magazine’s strategy and direction; in other 
words, to become part of ALR.
Further details of our ‘plan for growth’, and information on our ‘ALR 
supporters Association’ are available in a document we’ve put together 
for interested readers and supporters. If you’d like to obtain a copy, or if 
you simply want to find out more about our ‘Plan For Growth’, just fill in 
the form below. You don’t need to attach a stamp or pay for return 
postage.
: I’d like a copy of ALR’s ‘Plan For Growth’. Name(s)................................................................. j
| Please send a copy to:
Address................................................................  •
: Send this form to: ALR Plan, Freepost 28, PO
i Box A247, Sydney South, NSW 2000. No stamp ................................................ Postcode.............  j
: needed if posted in Australia. ’.....................................................................................................• 
................................................. .............................................................................................................................. ..
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LIBERAL
Arts
A species of economic liberalism haunted the 80s. Now 
John Hewson threatens to make afar stronger version the 
commonsense of the 90s. But just how well do we 
understand what neo-liberalism is all about? David 
Burchell quizzed British writer Graham Burchell on the
subject.
G raham Burchell is co-editor of The Foucault Effect (London, Harvester, 1991), a book of essays on the late 
French thinker Michel Foucault's 
conception of government. He is currently trans­
lating Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari's W hat is 
Philosophy?  He was a visiting scholar at Griffith 
University in August and September.
Your book explores the idea of governm ent and 
'governmentality' associated with the latter work of 
Michel Foucault. One of the themes which arises from 
that is Foucault's understanding of liberalism. What is 
distinctive about that conception of liberalism and how 
does it differ from traditional accounts of liberalism such 
as those of the marxist Left?
For the Left traditionally liberalism has been conceived in 
terms of some kind of ideology—whether it be a dishonest
mystification or a justification of capitalist practices. What 
interests me about Foucault's approach is that he identifies 
liberalism as a way of thinking about governmental ac­
tivities, how governments govern. Foucault identifies 
liberalism as preeminently a critical style of thinking about 
the necessary limits of government. It arose as a criticism 
of the characteristic form of government of the early 
modern period—raison d'etat, or the 'police state'. The as­
sumption of raison d'etat was that states are able to 'know' 
social reality and the economy and able to act to determine 
them in the interests of the state. The decisive point of 
liberalism's critique of this view is its scepticism about the 
state, both about its capacity to know the details of the 
economy and also its capacity to act to determine it.
The Anglo-Scottish tradition of classical liberalism sees the 
economy and more broadly society as a quasi-natural 
domain with its own internal regulations and its own inter­
nal dynamic. Intervention by the state in this domain, 
according to classical liberals, is liable to produce quite
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different effects from those which the state desires—and 
also probably unfortunate effects of some kind or another.
So we're not just talking about a different conception of 
liberalism, but also a different conception of the activity 
of government, and how government relates to the ob­
jects of government.
The view of liberalism that Foucault developed, and that 
we have tried to pursue in our book, is of liberalism as a 
distinctive 'art of government', a way of providing the 
activities of government with a principle of self-limitation. 
Foucault's focus is not so much on the liberal tradition of 
'freedom of the individual' in terms of rights, but on 
freedom of the individual as a technical necessity for the 
ability of the economy to function in terms of its own 
natural dynamic. By an 'art of government' Foucault 
means a way in which the activities of government can be 
rationalised—how they can be thought of in terms of some 
kind of rational principle of what governments can and 
can't do. Foucault's idea of 'governmentality', then, is not 
simply an idea of government in which the state performs 
functions in an instrumental way. It implies an active 
relationship between the state and its subjects or citizens, 
however they're defined. And this is an important part of 
the liberal conception of the practice of government in the 
first place.
One of the features of classical liberalism is to identify the 
economy and society as a kind of natural historical entity 
with its own internal dynamic, with its own internal forms 
of self-government and self-regulation. Liberalism also 
identifies the individuals to be governed as both the object 
of government and the partners of government. Classical 
liberalism—and I would say that is true for modern forms
of liberalism as well—sees the individual not just as a body 
with a set of capacities and internal forces to be shaped by 
a technical know-how, but as a natural reality that has to 
be taken into account in order to be able to govern its 
conduct. And the essential feature of that natural reality is 
its conduct according to a certain kind of rationality—in 
the case of early liberalism, a rationality of interest- 
motivated conduct of economic exchanges, but also con­
ducted by an individual who also has relations on a 
communitarian basis, spontaneous passional relationships 
of enmity and hatred, affiliation, disaffiliation, association 
and so on.
You asked how Foucault's conception differs from the 
classical marxist or Left view. I would say that the Left 
traditionally has never elaborated a distinctive art of 
government. It has traditionally concerned itself with who 
is governing, rather than with how to govern and the prin­
ciples which inform these techniques of government.
It may come as a surprise to people who look at neo­
liberalism today to see the picture you've just created of 
classical liberalism. In a sense classical liberalism is dis­
tinctive as the first serious response to the problem of 
civil society. Yet critics of neo-liberalism today are more 
inclined to say that it has no conception of society as a 
distinct entity. What is the relationship between classical 
liberalism and neo-liberalism in this respect?
For modern forms of neo-liberalism the nature of liberalism 
is still as a kind of critical thought concerning the limits of 
governmental action. For the German school of Ordo 
liberals that developed in the Germany during and after 
the Second World War, and which was very influential in 
the building of the Federal German Republic, the problem
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is marked particularly by the experience of National 
Socialism. Their argument was that National Socialism 
was not some gross aberration, but was the result of anti­
liberal policies which were adopted in the face of the 
perceived consequences of classical liberalism—the 
growth of the 'dangerous classes', and all the social 
problems associated with the growth of industrial society. 
The Chicago School mounted a similar critique of state 
interventionism. The question that is common to both of 
them—although they give slightly different answers—is 
how far can the competitive game of the market function 
as a principle for government itself. So there's both a 
continuity and a discontinuity with classical liberalism.
They're both looking for a principle for rationalising 
government preeminently in relation to the market. Where 
the neo-liberals differ, it seems to me, is that they don't 
regard that form of economic action in the market as being 
the product of human nature. It only exists, and can only 
exist, under certain political, institutional and legal condi­
tions which have to be constructed. And this is another 
point at which Foucault's approach seems to me distinc­
tive; when looking at these varieties of liberalism, he iden­
tifies the production of a set of problems to be solved rather 
than just a theory, or a utopian program, or even a set of 
policies—and least of all an ideology.
But in relation to the question of civil society, neo­
liberalism has a paradoxical aspect. On the one hand it 
argues that society is a product of government intervention 
and construction; society has been shaped by things like 
social insurance, workers compensation, welfare, social 
workers, teachers—the whole social apparatus of govern­
ment. It argues this has become an obstacle to the economy 
and leads to the inexorable growth of the state. So in one 
sense neo-liberalism is anti-civil society, and also anti­
government itself.
Yet in another sense one could see neo-liberalism as a kind 
of autonomisation of society. An example might clarify 
this. In watching the UK experience it has been interesting 
the extent to which the Conservative government, while 
often presented as 'rolling back the state', as returning to 
some kind of Victorian conservatism, has been extraor­
dinarily institutionally inventive in a number of areas.
An example is their education reforms. In one sense they're 
based on an economic model—the model of the enterprise. 
So, for example, each individual school has to operate 
according to a kind of competitive logic. It has to manage 
itself, it has to allocate the resources it is still given by the 
state, it has to carry out the program of the national cur­
riculum set by government, and also carry out tests of 
pupils which are established by government. But within 
that fram ework each individual school is a quasi­
enterprise, which has to engage in a kind of competitive 
relationship with other schools, both in terms of the results 
it tries to get, and thereby the pupils it attracts to the school, 
and therefore more money, and therefore a more successful 
school.
So in one sense there's a kind of economisation of what 
traditionally would have been seen as a public service
institution, something which would traditionally have 
been managed in other ways according to a social service 
philosophy. However, on the other hand, this is still a 
governmental technology; it is still a way of acting on the 
conduct of individuals and populations so as to form their 
conduct and their capacities.
It seems to me, then, that in a number of areas one can see 
taking place a kind of autonomisation of society, and not 
necessarily a destruction of society. It's recasting that space 
that was created by classical liberalism as preeminently the 
space for government, civil society, or 'the social'. A char­
acteristic feature of modern liberalism, which classical 
liberalism created, is this interface between society and the 
state, in which society is instrumentalised for the purposes 
of government. It seems to me that modem forms of 
liberalism are continuing in that vein.
There seems to be a paradox here. A large part of the 
rhetoric of neo-liberalism  is deregulatory. Yet as 
Grahame Thompson and others have pointed out, a large 
part of the practice of, for instance, Thatcherism in Britain 
has been as regulatory in some ways as it has been 
deregulatory in others.
And the same was exactly true of classical liberalism. As 
Colin Gordon puts it in the introduction of our book, 
liberalism doesn't mean a 'bonfire of controls'. On the 
contrary, it means precisely finding those regulations 
which would enable other types of natural regulations to 
work. In the case of modern liberalism it's a matter of 
finding those regulations which would enable a competi­
tive game of entrepreneurial conduct to function to its 
optimum, and to use that as a principle for both limiting 
and rationalising government itself. Government itself in 
a certain sense should become a quasi-enterprise.
One of the striking things about the current political 
debate in Australia which, in some senses, is a debate 
about neo-liberalism, is that both John Hewson and Paul 
Keating are conducting the debate about neo-liberalism 
as if they're talking about classical liberalism. So Paul 
Keating when he wants to attack John Hewson talks 
about Hewson wanting to 'return' Australia to the 19th 
century. But I take you as arguing two things in this 
context: first that their conception of classical liberalism 
is to some extent misplaced; and second that in fact 
neo-liberalism isn't simply a rerun of classical liberalism 
in any case.
I don't want to comment on the Australian situation be­
cause I don't know enough about it, but I think this same 
attitude imposed limitations on the critical response to the 
policies of the Conservative government in the UK during 
the 80s. The situation was quite similar; the Left was accus­
ing the Tories of taking us back to the dark ages of laissez 
faire and the god of the market. On the other hand, Mar­
garet Thatcher tried to 'confiscate critique' from the Left; 
to say the Conservatives were the radicals, that it was 
actually Labour which was the dinosaur.
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That attitude certainly did weaken our ability to under­
stand what was going on, and to think precisely about the 
inventiveness of what was happening—that it was actually 
new. Some American critics have been much more percep­
tive in that regard, pointing out that modem forms of 
economic liberalism have very little in common with the 
people they invoke. They have little in common with Adam 
Smith, and operate an incredibly selective reading of Adam 
Smith, ignoring vast swathes of his work—as well as other 
Anglo-Scottish classical liberals.
‘The Left has never 
developed on art of 
government of its own. ’
So do I understand rightly from what you're saying then 
that part of the problem on the Left is that it fails to 
understand the novelty and sophistication of the liberal 
tradition, and fails to understand that neo-liberalism's 
strength is as an art of government at a time— the last 20 
years or so—when there has been a crisis of confidence 
in the role of government in advanced capitalist societies.
Clearly, there were a number of works produced in the 80s 
which were very perceptive about particular aspects of 
what was going on. People like Stuart Hall working in 
cultural studies, for instance, did develop some fairly far- 
reaching critiques of exactly what was the nature of that 
culture growing up under the name of enterprise culture. 
But generally speaking I think what you say is right. Much 
Left criticism just misrecognised what was happening, and 
saw it as another avatar of capitalist self-interest, a step 
back to the 19th century.
The relationship between government and the economy is 
another aspect of the Left's response. Liberals have pegged 
their conception of government to some form of economic 
rationality, the rationality of the market—whether it be the 
'natural' market of classical liberalism or the constructed 
market of the neo-liberals. Thus they have always had to 
peg this conception to some sense of the performance of 
that economy. It would be rather odd to claim the supe­
riority of liberalism as a rationality of government pegged 
to economic action if the economy fails to perform—al­
though I don't think it's ever been clear, either for classical 
liberalism or modern neo-liberalism, what actually is une­
quivocally going to count as success.
In Britain, under the guise of monetarism, the government 
started off with one indicator, the money supply. That 
became two, then it became three, then other things had to 
be taken into account, then, of course, there were all these 
circumstances which were external. So that sense of liberal 
rationality becomes incredibly blurred. What hasn't be­
come blurred, however, is economic action itself as a prin­
ciple for governmental action. Whether the economy 
performs well or not, nonetheless the enterprise form can
be adopted and have a certain degree of success, even if its 
principal reference point fails to deliver the goods.
That's the sense in which it seems to me liberalism is 
preeminently a reflection on the art of government. The 
way in which liberalism takes hold is in providing a way 
of thinking about government activity and a way of con­
structing techniques for governing, rather than by its suc­
cess measured in economic indicators. I think, broadly 
speaking, Left critiques of neo-liberalism have not taken 
that on board. And they haven't taken it on board precisely 
because the Left has never developed an art of government 
of its own. Socialism has never developed a systematic 
reflection on how to govern, and on inventive techniques 
for governing.
There's a further paradox. In some senses the Left operates 
a double-sided critique. On the one hand it calls upon the 
state to protect us, to provide security for us, to secure our 
jobs and maintain our standard of living. On the other hand 
it critiques the state for constantly growing, interfering in 
our lives, directing our conduct, and so on. So, it has a 
schizophrenic relationship to the state. And I think that's 
partly because its relationship to the state is conceived in 
terms of political sovereignty. At the popular level, much 
Left discourse is pegged to some idea of popular 
sovereignty, and of dem ocratisation as a kind of 
generalised solution for everything, without thinking at all 
about the fact that however democratic any institution is, 
it's still going to have to have methods for managing its 
affairs. There are still going to be forms of power exercised 
over individuals, and there have to be people exercising 
that power over individuals. There are going to be 
problems of government, both in terms of performance and 
in terms of practicability and acceptability of those forms 
of government. Traditionally the Left has been seriously 
weak in developing that side of its thought.
As I said earlier, it is an open question whether there can 
be such a thing as a socialist art of government. That isn't 
to say one might not think of other ways of governing, or 
providing a critical reflection on how we govern ourselves 
and each other, or a critical inventiveness around techni­
ques of doing that are in some sense still attached to critical 
values like increased equity, decreased domination and so 
on. But it is an open question whether one would want to 
call that form of critical reflection socialist. Having said 
that, I would still want to retain one of the traditional 
questions of socialism—one which still poses a serious 
question for an art of government. That is the question of 
how do we live together in such a way that we maximise 
the capacities of each while minimising the restraints on 
how those capacities can be exercised.
Up to this point we've been discussing the failure of the 
radical Left, of the socialist tradition, to create an art of 
government which might provide an alternative to that 
of liberalism. But maybe there's also a broader problem 
here. As the context of the rise of neo-liberalism, par­
ticularly in the anglo-saxon countries, we've seen the 
breakdown of the postwar political 'historic compromise' 
upon which in certain respects postwar social democracy 
was based. And also, economically speaking, of the tools
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and techniques which were loosely labelled Keynesian. 
All of this was associated with social democracy, whether 
or not it was carried out by governments which called 
themselves social democratic. And so neo-liberalism has 
been able to hold the field. It's been able to say: we alone 
have a conception of the proper limits of government 
vis-a-vis society. We alone have an antidote to the 'nanny 
state'.
I'd agree with that. In fact, I'd perhaps qualify something I 
said earlier, in the sense that I'm not sure it is a question of 
creating an 'alternative model'. Any kind of alternative 
way of thinking about government is obviously not some­
thing that is just dreamed up and then proposed; it has to 
start from what is perceived to be a way of identifying the 
problems of government in a definite situation. I don't 
think it's a problem of model-building. And in that sense it 
is a generalised problem which extends to all candidates to 
government in the West in the postwar period.
I wouldn't be quite so pessimistic as you, however. In the 
practice of neo-social democracy in both Germany and 
France, there has been much more imaginative thought on 
the part of a governmental Left, if one can put it that way, 
than there has in the anglo-saxon countries. I'm thinking 
particularly about France around Jacques Delors' wing of 
the Socialist Party.
Might the ground for some neo-social democratic or post­
social democratic art of government then be some of the 
things which neo-liberalism does address but which his­
torically the Left has not been very good at—having more 
of a sense of the proper limits of government, more of a 
sense of the importance of the techniques of government, 
rather than simply the ends of governments?
I'd agree with that. It seems to me the level I'd like to see 
addressed is to start thinking in terms of practical experi­
ments, in terms of ways of governing—for example, in all 
the intermediate areas of society: practical ways in which 
education might be conducted differently, and so on. In that 
regard I'd make one last point. The interesting thing about 
some of the neo-liberal innovations is that they are not 
unambiguously bad; there are things the Left can learn 
from them as techniques and practices of government. This 
maybe true of some of the education reforms in Britain, for 
instance. But I also want to see in that some kind of critical 
valuation of what the costs are, in the sense of the human 
costs of different techniques. I'm not just saying: let's all 
become technocrats. I'm not suggesting it's just a question 
of dreaming up a new gadget of government. I'm suggest­
ing there are more desirable ways of conducting govern­
ment as well.
DAVID BURCHELL (no relation) is ALR's editor.
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understanding of politics □  Explore cultural or business 
opportunities □  Have a cheap & fascinating vacation
The course includes accommodation with a Russian family or in on- 
campus student flats, lectures, meetings, visits, interpreters, all transfers, 
orientation excursion, two excursions to tourist centres outside Moscow. 
Total price A$1654. On the December 1991 course, participants had 
discussions with people from all walks of life and they included Monica 
Attard, ABC Journalist; Yuri Valetsky, KGB Colonel; and Alexander 
Orordnikov, Leader of the Christian Democratic Union. They also visited 
places as diverse as a soup kitchen, demonstrations and tractor factory
■ ■  Course commencement dates
RED 
BEAR 
TDURS
1992 15 June, 13 July
1993 18 Jan, 7 June, 5 July
1994 12 Jan
For a brochure, call Athol Yates,
RED BEAR TOURS
320B Glenferrie Road, Malvern,
Melbourne Vic 3144
Tel: (03) 824 7183 Fax: (03) 822 3956
Free Call: 008 337 031
ALR: OCTOBER 1992
ALREVIEW  37
Suburbia Verite
Sylvania Waters: Some loved it, some 
hated it, everyone watched it anyway. 
Graeme Turner peers behind the extraor­
dinary response to ABC TV's 'real life 
soap'.
A mark of the quality of Philip Adams' 
com m unication sk ills  is his im­
probable su ccess in convincing  
Australia to see him as its all-purpose 
intellectual. Maybe it is the black skiv­
vy, or the beard, or the unlikely mix­
ture of populism and existentialism, 
but he is always getting wheeled in by 
the serious end of the media to offer 
short grabs on just about everything. 
So it was not surprising recently to see 
Philip Adams turn up on Lateline tell­
ing Kerry O 'Brien how ordinary 
Australians were reacting to Sylvania 
Waters. Nor was it surprising to hear 
the man who brought us Bazza Mc­
Kenzie sing the praises of this latest 
representation of the ugly Australian. 
"Noelene," he said, "is fabulous: I am 
thinking of starting up a Noelene fan 
club."
The public and critical reception of 
Sylvania Waters is a lot like that which 
surrounded The Adventures o f Barry 
McKenzie. C ritics , em inent per­
sonages, writers of letters to the editor 
and the like have made quite a fuss, 
objecting to the image of Australians 
created in the program and to the ef­
fect it might have on 'what people 
overseas' think of us. These are perfor­
mances from a pretty well developed 
genre of Australian cultural criticism 
by now; it makes its appearance, 
usually, when a particularly populist 
and unflattering set of representations 
appear on the big or small screen. 
While nobody worried that Picnic at 
Hanging Rock might have portrayed 
Australia as a land where girls walked 
in slow motion, rocks could make you 
disappear without reason, and a traf­
fic in St Valentine's Day messages be­
tween schoolgirls was the major form 
°f sexual transaction, there was cer­
tainly concern that people might think 
were all like Mick 'Crocodile' Dun­
dee.
It was hard to have much patience 
with such ideas when Bazza was 
around; it is even harder to have much 
patience with it now. For a start, 
'people overseas' think very little 
about us at all; even the enormous 
success of The Adventures o f Barry Mc­
Kenzie in Britain was at least as much 
due to the numbers of Australians in 
London as to British interest in 
Australians on film. In any case, since 
Australians all know that what we see 
on film and television is not real, it is 
a fair bet 'people overseas' know that 
too. The way in which television im­
ages are connected with and subject to 
other forms of representation was 
graphically demonstrated when A 
Current Affair mischievously showed 
a preview of Sylvania Waters to a 
'typical' English family in Britain. 
They hated N oelene and found 
Australian attitudes laughable, but 
they also said the sunshine made them 
want to emigrate.
Arguments about the appropriate 
image of Australia to present overseas 
are only possible if one feels sure that 
one's own version of the 'appropriate' 
or 'typical' is the right one. The polic­
ing of Australian content that so 
marked the funding and reception of 
Australian films of the 70s and early 
80s was about specifying an image of 
Australia, censoriously restricting the 
mythologies upon which our movies 
drew. The furore around Sylvania 
W aters is , am ong other things, 
evidence that nothing much has 
changed.
Of course, it is true that the wealthy 
lifestyle Noelene and Laurie enjoy is a 
long way from anyone's idea of typi­
cal. But what is remarkable about the 
program is that while Noelene and 
Laurie may not be typical they are 
certainly recognisable. I haven't met
anyone who wants to start up a fan 
club for Noelene, but I have met plen­
ty who find her painfully, irresistibly, 
familiar. The characters who wander 
through Sylvania Waters offer tremen­
dous potential for licensed, often 
pleasurable, voyeurism, precisely be­
cause they are quotations from our 
everyday lives.
I wouldn't want to push this reality 
effect too far, how ever. K erry 
O'Brien's interview placed the Syl­
vania Waters 'phenomenon' within the 
genre of 'reality television', the new, 
ever-cheaper, ever-trashier program­
ming format which brought us Cops, 
Hard Copy and Murder Squad. (Murder 
Squad is currently the only British ex­
ample on our screens, but it is just as 
worryingly intrusive, despite the 
respectfully modulated voice-over.) I 
would reject this connection. First of 
all, 'reality television' is something of 
a beat-up anyway. The term dignifies 
a raft of poorly structured current af­
fairs programs which are the way they 
are because they are cheaper like that, 
not because they offer us a fresh, un­
mediated view of the world. 'Reality 
television' is still television; it is no 
more real and no less constructed than 
a quiz show. As for the innovativeness 
and adventurousness disingenuously 
invoked in descriptions of the format, 
it is worth noting that the raw material 
of reality television so far is over­
whelmingly drawn from those who 
are too powerless, too poor, or too 
distressed to prevent their predica­
ments being turned into entertain­
ment.
Sylvania Waters, however, can't even 
lay claim  to the dubious alibi of 
'reality television'. The show is struc­
tured like soap opera, given its narra­
tive shape by the youngest son's 
voice-over, and edited with a great 
deal of thematic motivation. Indeed, 
among the implausibilities of the 
show 's production history is the 
pretence that it was ever anything but 
highly constructed.
When the British producers came out 
to promote Sylvania Waters, they 
delivered a load of nonsense to a gul­
lible Australian media about its being
L
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'fly on the wall' television, an attempt 
to cap ture and docum ent the 
everyday. A venerable tradition of ear­
lier quasi-ethnographic documen­
taries (Family, the Seven-Up series) was 
invoked as the appropriate genre 
model. This was deliberately mislead­
ing. In visual style, Sylvania Waters 
owes as much to Dynasty as to Seven- 
Up, and its intention is obviously to 
provide a d etailed  critiqu e of 
Australian society ordered around a 
tight narrative structure. Signs of this 
structure are all over the place. The 
producers are particularly fond of the 
m eaningful cross-cu t, m oving 
repeatedly between two locations in 
order to indicate some similarity be­
tween them . W hen the fam ily 
Christmas dinner was being con­
sumed, for instance, we cut between 
the people eating their food, and the 
dogs eating theirs. Not subtle, you'd 
agree—nor was it the viewpoint of 
some detached but observant 'fly on 
the wall'.
When Peter Couchman dealt with Syl­
vania Waters, he considered it as a soap 
opera—he asked soap stars to come 
along and talk about it and about their 
own work. The two 'battlers' from Syl­
vania Waters, Paul and Dione (they're 
the ones whom most people actually 
like, unless they know Philip Adams), 
were there too. They revealed, deli­
ciously, what we all suspected: that 
much of the show (up to 25%, they 
said) was set-up by the producers, that 
sequences were edited out of 
chronological order, that certain se­
quences were repeated (and thus 
placed into a context that was months 
away from when the actions first oc­
curred), and topics of conversation 
were occasionally initiated by the 
crew, not the families involved. This 
doesn't, in my view, make it that much 
less 'real'; it does establish, though, 
that the show 's producers m is­
represented its actual objectives and 
methods.
It is pretty clear that the concept for the 
show is firmly grounded in British 
conceptions of Australian life. The 
Poms are going to love it, since it 
strokes all their prejudices about 
Australians' uncouth materialism. To 
the extent that some of us might also 
harbour prejudices about classes of 
Australian life to which we think we 
no longer belong, we too have found 
it fascinating. There's more to it than 
that, though. W atching Sylvan ia  
Waters involves witnessing the sur­
vival of values and attitudes we 
thought were either gone or at least 
sufficiently stigmatised not to be 
deliberately expressed in public. We 
respond with outrage and shock—but 
also with keen amusement, a tolerance 
that can border on nostalgia. But we 
can't pretend we don't recognise what 
we see on the screen.
It is as if Sylvania Waters is helping us 
to remember earlier versions of the 
'Australian character'—v e r s i o n s  most 
of us would rather fo rg et— and
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remind us they are still around. What 
is particularly eloquent, and shocking 
in its own right, is the characters' ab­
solute self-confidence, the assurance 
with which their values are held and 
invoked. It is impossible not to be 
deeply impressed by the categoric cer­
tainty of Laurie's account of his step­
son, M ich ae l's , m otivations, for 
instance, or by Noelene's complete 
lack of self-doubt. Watching her, I was 
repeatedly reminded of one of Magda 
Szubanska's characters in Fast For­
ward: the chain-sm oking, heavily 
m ade-up office  w orker w hose 
children are abandoned to all kinds of 
misfortune while she wearily com­
plains about their ingratitude.
Unlike most soap opera, however, Syl- 
vania Waters does get harder to watch. 
I find it increasingly uncomfortable 
precisely because it demonstrates the 
hard iness of social m yths and 
prejudices, how old attitudes die hard. 
In some of the conversations, we do 
hear the conventional public voice of 
a contemporary, liberal-democratic 
Australia. But always insistently el­
bowing its way in is a much less 
tolerant, democratic, and pluralistic 
set of views. Sylvania Waters is often 
just plain ugly, because the ideologies
which surface in 'private' conversa­
tions and behaviours are unrepentant- 
ly consumerist, racist, xenophobic, 
homophobic, and sexist. In contrast to 
the material sophistication of their 
resort-style way of life, what these 
people say makes them seem like they 
just stepped off the set of Married with 
Children—only this is no sitcom. The 
result, for many viewers I have talked 
to, is major embarrassment. Noelene's 
expression of pride in her lust for a 
black stripper, a pride that is actually 
fuelled rather than undercut by her 
racism, gets my vote as one of the most 
embarrassing moments in Australian 
television.
Australian television has a strong 
tradition of the exploitation of embar­
rassment—from Norman Gunston to 
Perfect Match to Red Faces. But it's 
never been quite like this. In the past, 
the 'ordinary Australian' has largely 
been let off the hook. Even our sitcoms 
have been relatively tactful in com­
parison with those of other national 
TV industries. The A ustralian 
television industry has not produced 
the equivalent of Till Death Us Do Part, 
or All in the Family—sharply satirical 
but u ltim ately  tolerant repre­
sentations of lumpen regressive­
ness—until now. (The closest we got 
was probably Kingswood Country.) The 
worry is that while All in the Family 
relied on scripts performed by profes­
sional actors before an audience, Syl­
vania Waters involves members of the 
middle class performing renditions of 
their everyday life for the sole benefit 
of seeing themselves on TV. Where the 
worry turns to fascination is that the 
performances not only establish the 
differences between them and us, they 
also  m ake it hard to deny the 
similarities.
Relief from this discomfort is on its 
way, however. At least one commer­
cial channel is producing its own ver­
sion of Sylvania Waters to counter the 
ABC, and to avoid surrendering a 
whole genre of television to the com­
petition. The sharp edge is clearly 
going to get duller when we face an 
evening with 'suburbia verity on all 
channels, offering us the choice of Syl­
vania Waters, Killamey Heights, Green 
Valley and Sanctuary Cove. Thank God, 
SBS can't afford to produce its own.
GRAEME TURNER teaches in English 
at the University of Queensland. He is 
co-author of Myths o f  Oz (Allen and 
Unwin).
Cultural Football
The treasures of Angkor Wat are in Can­
berra: how they got there is a complicated 
story. Jeremy Eccles explains.
Culture as a political football is a 
metaphor that we don't often en­
counter in white Australia, where 
football is so much more important 
than the arts, education and history 
that it usually appropriates all the best 
imagery. Will we ever compare the 
flashing elegance of the 'Macedonian 
Marvel' Peter Daicos to a Zofrea? The 
positional sense of Mark Ella to Rover 
Thomas? Or the curving runs of Brett 
Kenny to Brett Whitely?
There are, of course, pros and cons to 
the notion. But, to encounter the arts 
of a country that matter so much that
its hopes and aspirations can be direct­
ly linked to its temples, its statues and 
its bronzes is an inspiring experience. 
Cambodia is the country in question; 
the great temple of Angkor Wat is the 
image that appears on its flag; and 35 
of its artistic treasures have left the 
country for the first time ever for Can­
berra, on a journey that has a variety 
of (mainly political) motives.
Perhaps the first thing to insist upon is 
that the treasures are worth seeing for 
purely aesthetic reasons. The sheer 
youthfulness of the faces and bodies of 
the Khmer statuary will be my most
lasting impression of this glorious 
work, made between the sixth and 
13th centuries AD.; the youth, and the 
beauty of the very human models, 
compared to the more stylized work 
being done elsewhere in Asia at the 
same time. The gods are the same - 
Buddha, Vishnu, Krishna, and so on. 
But the royal princess whose likeness 
was used for the Buddhist goddess of 
Perfect Wisdom is recognisably a child 
before she is divine; the seventh cen­
tury standing Buddha has liquid 
drapery covering its youthfully swell­
ing tummy; and the tenderly medita­
tive stone Head o f Jayavarman VII — 
both King and Buddha— forever seals 
in his youth a King who may have 
reigned into his 90s.
But the politics were there from the 
start. Indian traders allowed the mon-
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soons to blow them eastwards, but 
then had to wait a few months on the 
other side of the Gulf of Thailand 
before return was possible. They had 
plenty of time to pass on ideas and art 
styles to the distinctly less sophisti­
cated Khmers — who were probably 
only then, in the fifth and sixth cen­
turies, emerging from tribalism. Hin­
duism and Buddhism seem to have 
been bought separately by the tribal 
leaders and the people, with the future 
kings particularly taken with the 
Hindu concept of the deva-rahja, the 
god-king. To have your authority 
backed by divine force was much bet­
ter than the vote.
But you had to be able to prove it. 
Hence, every king from 800 to 1250— 
and some lesser mortals—built his 
own temple city. Angkor Wat, the most 
famous temple, is but one of these: a 
moated area 1300 by 1500 metres 
which housed religious officials in a 
sub-division of the city named Angkor 
by subsequent generations. No one 
knows its original name. The lower, 
perimeter galleries of the temple 
housed educational bas reliefs telling 
stories from The Ramayana and Mahab- 
harata. Priests officiated at higher 
levels while the King himself held 
Brahmanistic court with the gods in 
the uppermost sanctuary—possibly 
going through nightly fecundity rites. 
The whole pattern was modelled on
Borobudur in Java, recreating Mount 
Meru, the mountain home of the gods.
What no one knows from the evidence 
of existing stone tablets — no other 
writing survives — is who the non- 
ymous artists and craftsmen were 
who created these many wonders, 
which certainly didn't just copy In­
dian models. It has been assumed that 
the wealth necessary to afford so much 
non-productive labour derived from a 
parallel massive irrigation system. 
Over 250 years, three huge barays 
were built to hold 75 million cubic 
metres of water which, in turn, al­
lowed three rice crops a year. But some 
historians throw doubts on this ef­
ficiency- - and no one seems to know 
whether an assumed Angkor popula­
tion of 750,000 was held in slavery to 
achieve all this, or whether they will­
ingly accepted a metempsychotic 
society in which only the royals were 
hereditary (and had divine backing) 
and everyone else earned their place.
How did this whole edifice crumble 
into the jungles? In 1298, a Chinese 
traveller described a going civilisation 
(including the then 300 year old 
Reclining Vishnu statue in bronze 
whose gnarled and pitted head and 
shoulders amazingly sit in Canberra 
today). Then nothing, until the French 
'rediscovered' the temples in the 19th 
century and tried to tell their colonial
subjects that they must have been built 
by a different race of giants.
It seem s likely that encroaching 
Chams (from Vietnam) and the Thais 
were involved. There have been sug­
gestions of drugs and homosexuality. 
The last kings' conversion to the 
people's religion of Buddhism may 
have diminished their power (while 
also producing the m iraculously 
meditative Head o f  Jayavarman VII). 
M aybe all that tem ple build ing  
destroyed  the econom y, for the 
wonderful Bayon temple required 54 
towers decorated with 216 giant Bud­
dhist heads. Could there even have 
been a positive decision to relocate to 
Phnom Penh on that great artery of 
trade and com m u nication , the 
Mekong?
Whatever their motives, the French 
did much to tell the world about the 
Khmer wonders. They excavated in 
stifling heat, they hacked back jungle 
trees and creepers, they rebuilt heaps 
of stones into tem ples, and they 
founded the National Museum. Vir­
tually none of their research, though, 
was fed back to the Cambodians; the 
Canberra exhibition catalogue is 
claimed to be the first in both English 
and Khmer. This perhaps goes some 
way to explain why the Khmer Rouge, 
while attempting to deny the very ex­
istence of history with their concept of
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Year Zero, simply ignored their artis­
tic birthright They locked the doors 
but failed to destroy it—as they set out 
to destroy anyone who might have an 
understanding of it, and anyone who 
might be able to organise its conserva­
tion.
This is where the Australian National 
Gallery came in. Eighteen months 
ago, Asian curator Michael Brand set 
out through South East Asia to make 
institutional links. In Phnom Penh he 
met Pich Keo, now director of the Na­
tional Museum— the sole survivor 
from French days, saved because his 
archeology-roughened hands were 
mistaken for those of a peasant Brand 
realised that exchanges of art were of 
far less use to the Cambodians than a 
swap of their art for Australian skills 
and training facilities. This became 
political when Gareth Evans took the 
deal to Prime Minister Hun Sen and 
also won the enthusiastic backing of 
Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Agree­
ment w as signed last December. 
Amazingly, no money has changed 
hands for an exhibition insured for
US$35 million, and few details have 
been worked out yet for Australia's 
contributions in kind.
At this stage cultural politics entered 
the arena. The Japanese had plans for 
an exhibition in 1993, but the Cam­
bodians wanted Australia honoured 
first. Then the French, British and 
A m ericans wanted to take the 
Australian exhibition on to their 
countries. But the sheer logistics of 
choosing pieces strong enough to 
travel (two were left behind at the last 
moment because of uncertainty), con­
structing individual packing cases for 
each piece (which the Cambodians 
will keep), and involving the RAAF 
(the only organisation used to Phnom 
Penh airport with planes big enough 
and its own lifting equipment) all 
combined to make onward travel im­
possible. And, as Michael Brand in­
sists, decisions like that ought to wait 
until the Cambodians know enough 
about the conservation of their own 
art to come to their own conclusions.
With all this political football in the 
background, at the exhibition's open­
ing Paul Keating spoke intensely of 
the "power of culture to unite people 
and heal differences". A message from 
Prince Sihanouk spoke of "once again 
achieving the greatness of the Angkor 
Period in C am bod ia". An older 
Gareth Evans than the one who back- 
packed around Cambodia in the 60s 
looked on benevolently. But perhaps 
the happiest person there was Sylvie 
Kea Chin, a young woman who has 
spent more than 20 years in Australia, 
but who felt that now she was reunit­
ing herself with her real culture. "My 
people lost their souls under the 
Khmer Rouge, but we always had 
postcards, photos and wall-hangings 
at home of these artworks, which kept 
our culture alive. To see something 
like the Vishnu statue here in Canber­
ra makes me feel so strong, knowing 
this was made by my people so long 
ag o ". A nyone in tend ing to be 
anywhere near Canberra before 25 
October should go to see what she 
means.
JEREMY ECCLES is a Sydney 
freelance writer.
Identity Crisis
Living in the Margins: Racism, 
Sexism and Fem inism  in 
Australia, by Jan Pettman (Allen 
and Unwin, 1992). Intersexions: 
Gender! Class!Culture/Ethnicity, 
edited by Gill Bottomley, Marie de 
Lepervanche and Jeannie Martin 
(Allen and Unwin, 1991). Reviewed 
by Kitty Eggerking.
Take the (not entirely  
hypothetical) exam ple of a 
women's health centre. You 
might expect a congenial and 
committed working place, but 
instead you find the place seeth­
ing with acrimony: each woman 
is proclaiming that she has been 
more oppressed than the others 
by reason of a) her class back­
ground, b) her cultural back­
ground, c) her sexuality and d) 
her disabilities. There, is, in
short, a peculiar competition in 
play whereby each woman is at­
tempting to be top of the peck­
ing order— is somehow  
"purer"—by dint of the number 
of points of oppression she can 
lay claim  to. The scene is 
rem iniscent of W erner 
Hertzog's terrifying film, Even 
Dwarves Started Small. Forgot­
ten in this power struggle are 
the two points that connect 
these workers: the common 
ground of being women and of 
working for the health of other 
women.
If such a scenario is possible in a work­
ing environment where you might ex­
pect a sense of professionalism, of 
discipline, to prevail, then how is co­
operation, let alone harmony, to be 
found in voluntary associations, com­
munity organisations and ordinary 
social relations between individuals? 
You may think this is the stuff of 
science fiction, but such are the con­
cerns of those who speculate on the 
politics of identity. Associated with 
this politics of identity is what Jan Pet­
tman calls the politics of boundary 
making which, in turn, makes use of 
Foucault's nexus between power and 
know ledge, a notion not so far 
removed from the older Gramscian 
notion of hegemony.
According to this view, dominant dis­
courses in effect put boundaries 
around social groups like women, 
Aborigines and migrants that serve to 
oppress such groups and to denote 
those who are to be included in the 
subordinate groupings or excluded 
from the dominant group. Such boun­
daries are imagined, but are at the 
same time real. In the case of women, 
Aborigines and migrants, the boun­
daries once had to do with supposed
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biological characteristics; through 
mounting criticism and subsequent 
change in official policy, they have 
shifted, but certainly not disappeared.
The late Jean Martin, in the Migrant 
Presence, charted the early connections 
betw een ch an g es in "p u blic  
knowledge" and subsequent changes 
in official policy towards migrants, 
and this work has been carried on, in 
altered forms, by feminist writers like 
Jan Pettman in her Living in the Mar­
gins and the contributors to Inter- 
sexions. In these recent works—and 
particularly in Pettman's—there are 
suggestions that with the new policies 
of equal opportunity, affirmative ac­
tion and multiculturalism, formerly 
oppressed groups come to have a 
vested interest in keeping the boun­
daries firmly in place, since they can 
make political mileage, gain extra con­
cessions, from their new-found iden­
tities.
The difficulty I have with such a 
politics of identity has to do with the 
nature of those identities. We are all 
more than our language, our gender, 
our sexuality, aren't we? We can all 
step in and out of roles as the situation 
demands, can't we? Why do we there­
fore insist on wearing these gleaming 
badges of oppression? Why do we 
want to flaunt these oppressed iden­
tities? While the recognition of an op­
pression is the start of the end of that 
particular oppression, it is still a long 
way from liberation. (What a splen­
didly old-fashioned ring that word 
has!) People wear their oppression, 
live their oppression, forgetting that 
the behaviour is the behaviour of the 
oppressed, rather than that of a 'free' 
individual. Thus, women, for in­
stance, assert that behaviour like tears, 
tem per tantrum s and em otional 
blackmail is natural, just part and par­
cel of an essential femaleness. Non­
sense: these are the old ploys, the old 
responses to oppression. A new be­
haviour awaits discovery. And the 
preoccupation with identity does not 
rest with the self; it extends to the 
classification of others, usually in­
formed by visual or verbal cues. This, 
o f co u rse , is the old bogey of 
stereotyping at work again—this time 
in the hands of its erstwhile victims.
Although feminism and multicul­
turalism are 'isms' of differing orders, 
both are capable of generating the
politics of identity. Multiculturalism, 
in its best light, represents a fair go for 
all; in this light it remains an official 
policy, but one borne out of humanism 
and a desire for equality. On another 
construction it is the means for 
ameliorating social tensions, or, as 
some writers insist, for diffusing class 
struggle. It is a doctrine that has been 
handed down from on high and 
eagerly grasped by those whose cul­
tural background is not A nglo- 
Australian. And it has been used by 
them to institute power struggles 
within their own particular cultural 
setting, to set up hierarchies of cul­
tural truths and to produce 
'legitimate' spokespersons. The resul­
tant voices are usually male, as Jan 
Pettman reminds us.
In its worst light, multiculturalism 
represents a new, softer racism, one 
that erects 'cultural' distinctions 
where biological distinctions once 
stood. The problem for multicul­
turalism is that it rests on a static ver­
sion of traditional culture. But culture 
is very fluid and is transformed when­
ever meaningful exchanges with other 
cultural elements occur. Indeed, as 
Claude Levi Strauss was fond of ob­
serving, a culture doesn't know it is a 
culture until it bumps into another 
culture. It is the contact that allows 
recognition, even self-consciousness. 
A nother problem  for m ulticul­
turalism is that it rests on tolerance, 
thus guaranteeing unequal power 
relations, since (as writers like Ghas- 
san Hage note) the tolerators can al­
ways withdraw their tolerance from 
the tolerated and those tolerated must 
ensure that they do nothing to offend 
the tolerators. In all of this the bigger 
bogey of institutional racism goes un­
touched, unchallenged.
Feminism, on the other hand, has been 
created by women for women, and 
has occasionally informed official 
policy. Women have articulated its 
philosophies. Feminist theory at its 
very best is a powerful tool for trans­
forming women's lives and for chal­
lenging patriarchy. Because it is so 
powerful, so sensible, so usable we 
tend to think its message is universal. 
We forget that feminisms have been 
constructed to reflect certain realities 
in the lives of western women. We do 
not like to think of feminism as a 
weapon that can be used to proselytise 
women from non-western societies,
women who do not share our par­
ticular experience or view of the 
world. The words of Grace Mera 
Molisa from Vanuatu, quoted in Inter- 
sexions, are a forceful reminder:
Women's Liberation...is a European 
disease to be cured by Europeans. 
What we are aiming for is not just 
women's liberation but a total libera­
tion. A social, political and economic 
liberation...European women 
thought up Women's Liberation be­
cause they didn't have enough to do, 
and they were bored out of their 
minds. They were sick of being orna­
ments in the house. They hate their 
men for it. That's not our position at 
all.
Of course, we will challenge the truth 
of such statements from our own cul­
ture and experience, but views like 
these are important reminders that 
feminism can be another dominant 
western ideology which, like Chris­
tianity and capitalism, we foist upon 
non-western societies. And of course, 
we can say of women like Molisa that 
they have yet to recognise the ways 
they are oppressed by their men, and 
that once they perceive their false con­
sciousness, they can be 'saved' by 
feminism.
Both multiculturalism and feminism 
can help institutionalise an atomistic 
and alienated society— one based on 
the wounded individuals found in the 
hypothetical health centre— or they 
can be used to connect these in­
dividuals through their various op­
pressions. The in tricacies of the 
politics of identity and of boundary 
making are superbly untangled in 
Pettm an's book, while Intersexions 
begins to plot some of the ways that 
the paths of the oppressed might 
cross. In the end we can all choose to 
remain victims or to struggle together 
for a fairer society. If we allow the 
politics of identity to predominate, 
then the wish of the Indigo Girls will 
come true:
How I wish I were a trinity
So if I lost a part of me
I'd still have two of the same...
KITTY EGGERKING works at the 
journalism school at the University of 
Technology.
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Unequal and Different
Contemporary Western 
European Feminism, by Gisela 
Kaplan. London, Allen & Unwin, 
1992. Reviewed by Carol Bacchi.
Gisela Kaplan has undertaken a 
mammoth and necessary task: 
to introduce the women's move­
ments of western Europe (to 
1988) to the 'English-language 
circuit'. Her starting premise—  
that fem inist analyses have 
been dom inated by the ex­
periences of English-speaking 
countries, in particular America 
and Britain—is doubtless cor­
rect. The insights which can 
come from comparative studies 
which range beyond these bor­
ders is undeniable.
One of the chief constraints on such 
analyses is the language barrier. Here, 
Kaplan brings an enviable grasp of 
seven of the major languages of the 
countries she surveys. This gave her 
access to the large volume of feminist 
writing and government policy docu­
ments necessary for such an undertak­
ing.
Kaplan concluded that the experien­
ces of western European feminists 
fitted most readily into commonly 
used territorial divisions. Hence, the 
book has sections on 'Progressivism in 
Scandinavia', 'Conservatism in the 
G erm anic C o u n trie s ', 'C reative 
Traditionalism in France and the 
Netherlands', and 'Revolution and 
radicalism in southern Europe'. At the 
same time, she endeavours to do jus­
tice to the varied experiences of each 
national m ovem ent w ithin these 
groupings.
She offers wonderful potted histories 
of each country. Not only are we given 
essential h istorical and cultural 
details, but there are also summaries 
of each government's equality initia­
tives and the history of feminist or­
ganisations and feminist activities in 
each country. The four thematic sec­
tions conclude with explanations of 
the particular model which provide
thoughtful insights into "the patterns 
of action between protest movements, 
society at large, and the government 
of the day". As examples, we are made 
aware of the importance of the formal 
commitment of Scandinavian govern­
ments to gender equality, the way in 
which governments in France and the 
Netherlands take dissent seriously, 
and the fact that Italian feminists have 
been able to tap into a lively leftist 
political culture.
Unfortunately—and it is here that I 
felt a great disappointment with this 
book—there is an odd lack of fit be­
tween the book's case-studies and its 
theoretical overviews. Worse still, 
many readers will be put off by the 
superficial treatment of complex 
feminist theory in parts of the book. 
Often the reader is left floundering 
both as to the author's position on the 
issues raised and her intention in rais­
ing them.
At the very outset, Kaplan mentions 
the way in which feminists have chal­
lenged some of the fundamental or­
ganising concepts of traditional 
political theory: the 'public', the 
'private', the 'social'. But she never 
tells us why this is relevant to her 
study and often, to my mind at least, 
falls into conventional usage herself. 
She certainly seems intent throughout 
the text on emphasising the impor­
tance of 'political' engagement and is 
overtly critical of "self-advocacy", 
getting bogged down in one's own 
critique, and "forfeiting the public 
space" which feminists have claimed.
This might be acceptable if Kaplan 
could dem onstrate that the two 
modes of operation are as distinct as 
her analysis implies, and that 'success' 
is more closely aligned with one than 
the other. Unfortunately, she doesn't 
offer any means of assessing feminist 
'victories' other than the acceptance 
by governments of a range of equality 
legislation. Though she asserts at the 
outset that she will inquire into the 
effects these reforms have on the 
everyday life of women, she doesn't 
do so and perhaps could not have 
done so within the constraints of the 
project. This leaves many unanswered
questions about her understanding of 
the 'political' and of 'political change'.
When Kaplan takes up the much- 
debated dichotomy between concerns 
of equality and difference she leaves 
readers similarly uncertain about the 
relevance of these comments to her 
case-studies. She claims that feminists 
take one of three approaches to 
equality . The first she calls 
'transformative', and one can only 
wonder why she fixed on this word 
given her description of its content— 
"Implicit in this argument is the view 
that women need not spend much 
time in questioning 'the system'." 
This, we are told, is closely aligned 
with a justice claim. And both of these 
are clearly marked off from something 
called "the special value perspective".
Kaplan acknowledges that the three 
com m only labelled  fem inist 
strand s— lib era l, rad ical and 
socialist—had adherents in western 
Europe. She even sounds sympathetic 
at times to a socialist feminist analysis, 
highlighting again and again that 
reform s which leave underlying 
structures intact will ultimately fail. 
And yet this perspective is omitted in 
the theoretical overview. Moreover, 
despite the occasional passing refer­
ence to patriarchy, the role of men as 
subverters of feminist claims receives 
very little attention. There is also an 
odd tension in the book between the 
insistence that "the suppleness of the 
economic structure" can "accom ­
modate any changes" and the endor­
sement of a strategy of concentrating 
feminist energies on "the public and 
the political arena".
As to the "special value perspective", 
it is clear here and elsewhere in the 
text that Kaplan is deeply concerned 
by anything that sm acks of 
'essentialism'—which is to say, the 
belief that women display a range of 
virtues such as nurturance because of 
their essential nature. While I am sym­
pathetic to this concern, she does little 
justice to the theoretical debates 
which surround this topic. In fact, she 
is downright insulting in aligning es- 
sentialist feminist analyses with fas­
cism. She claims here that countries
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which have experienced fascism, in­
cluding Italy, will have little truck 
with this dubious claim, ignoring the 
well-developed and challenging work 
of the Milan Women's Bookstore Col­
lective (Sexual Difference: A Theory of 
Social-Sym bolic Practice, Indiana 
University Press, 1987). Kaplan ad­
mits that the 'special values' approach 
may have been useful in the necessary 
development of women's new iden­
tity, and she rates this development as 
one of the major successes of the 
women's movements. But nowhere 
does she tease out how different 
feminist approaches may have in­
fluenced and assisted one another.
One final irritating aspect of the 
theoretical overview is Kaplan's sug­
gestion that there is a fundamental 
ideological conflict within feminism 
over attitudes towards privacy and 
politics. She argues that in the abor­
tion campaign feminists were making 
a 'deregulatory' move, demanding 
that governments step back from the 
areas of contraception and childbirth 
because of their 'intimate' nature. 
Then, she claims, they contradicted 
themselves by inviting the state to 
regulate domestic violence disputes.
The point here is that feminists were 
challenging those who labelled these 
areas of life 'private' and 'public' ac­
cording to their own agendas. The 
feminist claim that 'the personal is 
political' was meant to highlight how 
all such designations are inherently 
political and to assert women's equal
right to engage in the politicking. If, in 
the process, they used particular dis­
courses such as that of privacy, surely 
this says more about the limited 
strategic alternatives available to 
feminists than about their ideological 
consistency or otherwise.
These points are disturbing because 
one of Kaplan's chief contributions is 
precisely her sensitivity to the way in 
which feminists have to manoeuvre 
within the contradictions of the sys­
tem they are attempting to influence. 
Unfortunately, this insight is not evi­
dent in the theoretical sections of the 
text.
In offering some starting hypotheses, 
presumably to guide us through the 
detailed narratives to follow, Kaplan 
usefully dismisses simplistic equa­
tions about progressiveness on 
women's issues; for example, correla­
tions between religion, or the wealth 
and size of a particular country. How­
ever, she then goes on to suggest an 
equally  sim plistic analysis— the 
'seesaw effect'—"that when women 
succeed in one or two spheres there are 
certain backlashes in the other one or 
two; for instance, when women have 
achieved fairly high representation in 
politics, it is highly unlikely that they 
w ill have any equality either in 
economic terms or in their private 
lives".
Yet, as Kaplan goes on to show, the 
Scandinavian countries lead the world 
both in female political representation
and in a range of social benefits such 
as child care and parental leave. 
Sweden introduced legalised abortion 
with little dissent and makes a formal 
commitment to increasing domestic 
ro le-sh arin g  betw een men and 
women—all reforms which affect 
women's 'private' lives. True, there 
are weak spots in the Scandinavian 
reform agenda—there has been little 
success in attem pts to a lter sex 
segregation in the workforce, for ex­
ample, and violence against women 
has only recently come onto the politi­
cal agenda—but, surely, it is more use­
ful to disentangle the complex reasons 
for this uneven progress than to im­
pose a formula which simply doesn't 
work.
Given Kaplan's decision to paint with 
a broad brush, some of the painting is 
slipshod, but this should not deter 
readers from buying and reading Con­
temporary Western European Feminism. 
There is a wealth of material here and 
some thoughtful insights on par­
ticular countries. It is just unfortunate 
that, instead of signposting such in­
sights in an introduction and drawing 
them together in a conclusion, Kaplan 
uses the opening and closing sections 
to offer theoretical analyses which are 
d istractin g  and in su ffic ien tly  
developed to be meaningful.
CAROL BACCHI teaches in the 
Research School of Social Sciences at 
the Australian National University.
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XY: men, sex, politics. XY is a nation­
al magazine for and about men. XY 
affirms a healthy, life-loving, non- 
oppressive masculinity and explores 
issues of gender and sexuality. Sub­
scriptions are $15 (full-time), $12 
(part-time), $10 (unwaged). Institu­
tional subscriptions ($36), group 
subscriptions ($25). Sample copies 
are $5. XY, PO Box 26, Ainslie ACT 
2602.
WANT TO  FIGHT 'Fightback!'?
Baffled by 'bracket creep'? Fightback 
or Frightpack: an Education and Action 
Kit has analyses by leading trade 
union, environmental, community 
and women's movement activists. 
Also a guide to what you can do to 
stop H ew son. Cost $5 plus $1 
postage, or 5 for $20 incl. postage. 
Send cheque to New Left Party, Box 
19, Trades Hall, 4 Goulburn St., Syd­
ney 2000, or ring (02) 264 7789.
THE AUSTRALIAN W OMEN'S 
STUDIES ASSOCIATION presents 
its fourth National Conference on the 
9th, 10th, 11th October 1992 at
Women's College, University of Syd- 
ney. C onference topics include 
Sexual Harassment in Education, 
Teaching About Women, Gender and 
D ifferen ce, Fem inism  and 
Postmodernism, Rethinking Lesbian 
Desire and Women, Shopping and 
Consumption. Speakers include Liz 
G rosz, Jan Pettm an, Rosem ary 
Pringle, Robin Rowland, Denise 
Russell and Susan Sheridan. For fur­
ther inform ation con tact the 
Women's Studies Centre on (02) 692 
3638.
ALR's Listings are available at extreme­
ly reasonable rates to all groups inter­
ested in advertising. Phone (02) 565 
1855fo r  details. First listing free.
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The Full Loaf
In "Half a Loaf" (ALR 142, August) 
Muriel Porter writes of the Anglican 
women's movement as "tired and 
despondent now as we take the last 
weary steps to the rescue tent". The 
General Synod in July gave women's 
ordination as priests the highest vote 
since the issue has been debated 
(80% of bishops, 70% each of clergy 
and laity), but the vote was still too 
low for the measure to come into 
effect.
Yet, far from being tired and despon­
dent, many Anglican feminists are 
full of life despite— or because of— 
recent experiences. These years have 
been filled with legal decisions 
about- the ordination of women (in 
some cases the lack of them) in 
church and secular courts, with 
bishops announcing dates and times 
for ordaining women and then can­
celling the ceremony. We have been 
ashamed at our opponents' state­
ments about women and about the 
church, exasperated by those in the 
church who put legal niceties above 
blatant discrimination. Tired and 
despondent, no; exasperated, ener­
gised and, above all, with a healthy 
perspective about the capacity of in­
stitutional structures to bring justice 
into being, yes.
So MOW decided not to have the 
familiar singing protest outside St 
Andrew's Cathedral by which we 
have greeted the bishops ("not an 
ovary between them", as Patricia 
Brennan observed of the Lambeth 
Conference of 500 bishops in 1988). 
Our absence from our familiar loca­
tion was obviously noticed. But the 
church establishment simply looked 
in the wrong spot.
We did, however, have a gathering 
of considerable note, just before the 
service. Women and men packed Pitt 
Street U niting Church to hear 
Wendy Fatin (the Minister Assisting 
the Prime Minister for the Status of 
Women) launch Changing Women 
Changing Church, a collection of es­
says in honour of Patricia Brennan, 
MOW foundation president. The 
m in ister a lso launched the 
Australian Feminist Theology Foun­
dation, which will enable us to con­
tinue to challenge the high levels of 
testosterone in all the Christian chur­
ches. The book's contributors (who 
included Sister Veronica Brady and 
Bishop John Spong) were interna­
tional and Australian, academics, 
clergy and lay, women and men, 
Catholic and Anglican. This oc­
casion, deliberately planned to 
precede General Synod and to which 
all General Synod members were in­
vited, spoke as eloquently as ban­
ners and singing have done in the 
past. It celebrated  intellectual 
strength and pastoral commitment, 
horizons and bonds far broader, 
more vigorous and more imagina­
tive than institutional church struc­
tures such as the General Synod.
We are caught up in a revolution— 
or, if that is too strong a word for 
Christian sensibilities, a transforma­
tion. That is what is happening as the 
churches encounter the women's 
movement. And their structures are 
changing: slowly and very diffident­
ly, but enough to keep Anglican 
feminists going. There are a dozen 
women priests in the Anglican 
Church in Australia, and another 
170 deacons. Snatches of conversa­
tion can be heard about women as 
bishops. Church language is chang­
ing, although you have to know 
where to go to hear "sisters and 
brothers" and biblical images for 
God other than "Almighty" and 
"F ath er". Women make up the 
largest number studying in many 
theological colleges; as women un­
derstand theology very differently 
from the way men do, a quiet revolu­
tion may be under way there too.
And women are increasingly ap­
parent in the decision-making struc­
tures of the church.
As in any revolution, change begins 
as sporadic and scattered; '1789' is 
not the sam e as 'th e  French 
Revolution'. Institutional forces for 
continuity are always greater than 
forces for change. There is, however, 
great energy in the fem inist or­
ganisations of various Christian 
traditions, of which MOW is only 
one. FUN (Feminist Uniting Net­
w ork), New Vision for Woman 
(Catholic Church), and Women and 
the Australian Church (Catholic 
Church), as well as numerous infor­
mal groups such as the Geelong 
Feminist Group are where the ener­
gy flourishes. Many such women are 
involved in their church's struc­
tures, but they sit lightly in them. 
More importantly, we realise we 
have more in common with our 
feminist friends in other denomina­
tions than we do with some mem­
bers of our own. Half the Kingdom, a 
documentary shown last year on 
SBS, revealed how close the ex­
p erien ces of exclu sion  and 
stereotyping of Jewish women are to 
those of many Christian women. 
The first two ecumenical Christian 
fem inist conferences drew 
hundreds, with prominent speakers 
such as Justice Elizabeth Evatt, Presi­
dent of the Australian Law Reform 
Commission.
The links between feminists in the 
church and the wider wom en's 
movement are not a whim of mo­
ments of sorrow or joy. Supporters in 
the women's movement have en­
couraged renewed energy. Anne 
D eveson and other prom inent 
women were much in evidence at 
the non-ordination rallies in Goul- 
burn. Likewise, in Perth in March, 
Wendy Fatin, Pat Giles (first woman 
senator from  WA) and other 
pioneering women politicians were 
present, all full of admiration for 
Patricia Brennan and MOW general­
ly. And, of course, there was the 
deluge of support from women in 
the community in phone calls and 
letters, as well as that ubiquitous 
forum of views, chat-show radio.
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The Movement for the Ordination of 
Women is now faced with a dilem­
ma. The agenda we have persistently 
brought to the church's notice is now 
part of the mainstream debate in that 
church. Some of us are involved in 
the church's structures. The issue for 
us is the future after ordination—for 
the women ordained, lay women, 
men in the church, for the church as 
a voice of justice in the community. 
We will continue to be a prophetic 
voice to the Anglican Church. We 
will continue our ministry of irrita­
tion, of support for women who 
have been ordained or have not been 
ordained. We will continue to ex­
plore priesthood, language about 
God, authority. We will continue to 
expand our ecumenical and interna­
tional networks. And while bishops' 
names might appear on the success­
ful motions and historic plaques, we 
and our families and friends and the 
community at large will remember 
the sacrifice and energy that was 
such a challenge to the institutional 
church.
Some supporters of the ordination of 
women regard MOW as counter­
pro d u ctiv e, negative, and a 
hindrance to their way of addressing 
the issue. We have made and will 
continue to make a strong contribu­
tion to the transformation of the 
church. We speak with clarity and 
excellen t in form atio n ; we are 
moderate and reasonable under the 
most trying of circumstances; all we 
have ever really done is tested the 
sincerity of the establishment and 
shown that the establishment mes­
sage so often lacks substance and 
life.
One cannot possibly be tired and 
despondent in such an environment 
for long. Energy in the Christian 
feminist movement is abundant, 
generous-spirited, and undaunted 
by the in stitu tio n al churches' 
ridicule and dismissal. But it is in 
danger of being lost to those chur­
ches.
JANET SCARFE is president of 
the Movement for the Ordination 
of Women.
Radical Changes
Pat O'Shane's interview in ALR 141 
(July), on the occasion of the 25th 
anniversary of the 1967 referendum, 
failed to highlight the radical chan­
ges and the progress which has been 
made in Aboriginal and Torres Strait 
Islander Affairs in recent years as a 
result of policies of the federal Labor 
government.
The establishment of the Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander Commis­
sion (ATSIC) is no mere bureaucratic 
reform but a radical and fundamen­
tal shift in power to Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander people. The 
decision-making control over expen­
diture and policy formulation of the 
former Department of Aboriginal 
Affairs and Aboriginal Develop­
ment Commission has now been 
transferred from Canberra to the 60 
elected Regional Councils of ATSIC 
and a national Board of 20 Commis­
sioners, 17 of whom are elected by 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
people across Australia.
ATSIC will no doubt evolve in the 
years ahead to give further effect to 
the right of Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander people to self-deter­
mination, but the fundamental shift 
has already occurred and the effect 
of greater indigenous control over 
policy and expenditure will have a 
dramatic impact on the lives of 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
people. G overnm ents and 
politicians need to come to terms 
with this radical shift in decision­
making power and it is important 
that Australians generally—and 
particularly those on the Left—also 
keep pace with the nature and extent 
of the reform.
The Royal Com m ission into 
Aboriginal Deaths in Custody began 
in 1987 and reported in 1991. How­
ever, its significance and ongoing 
impact is still not fully appreciated. 
The Commission's final report did 
not accord with the expectation of 
many in the community that the 99 
deaths it investigated were the result 
of foul play—a conclusion which 
many found difficult to accept. But
the report stands as an indictment of 
the legal and corrective services sys­
tem in respect of the most disad­
vantaged group in A u stralian  
society, and of our society itself, in 
allowing that situation to develop 
and persist. It found that Aboriginal 
and Torres Strait Islander people are 
over-represented in custody at a rate 
29 times that of the general com­
munity. In some states the rate is con­
siderably higher, and even escalated 
during the time of the Royal Com­
mission. The Report found that those 
who died did not lose their lives as a 
result of isolated acts of unlawful 
violence or brutality. They were 
found to be victims of entrenched 
and institutionalised racism and dis­
crim ination. Their deaths were 
found to be the tragic consequence of 
two centuries of dispossession, dis­
persal and appalling disadvantage.
The federal government announced 
its support for 338 of the 339 recom­
mendations. With limited excep­
tion s, state and territory  
governments came forward with 
responses which were broadly com­
parable to the Com m onw ealth 
response. An extensive regime of ac­
countability has been established to 
hold governments to their obliga­
tions. ATSIC will give an annual ac­
count of the extent to which all 
Commonwealth agencies are meet­
ing their obligations, and states and 
territories are expected to make 
sim ilar arrangem ents. A con­
solidated report to parliament on the 
implementation of Commonwealth 
undertakings will be made each 
year.
Pat O 'Shane identified features 
which she saw as essential to a 
response to the Royal Commission 
recommendations— land, health, 
employment, education, housing, 
training and law and justice proce­
dures. Not surprisingly, the federal 
governm ent agrees w ith these 
priorities, as they are largely similar 
to the priorities that were identified 
in extensive consultations with 
Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
communities in the development of 
its response to the recommenda­
tions.
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Over $400 million of new funds has 
been committed for programs to ad­
dress these priorities over the next 
five years. This funding includes 
some $60 million for land acquisi­
tion and development programs, 
$450 million for Aboriginal Legal 
Services, $71 million for drug and 
alcohol services, and an array of new 
and expanded employment and 
economic development programs. 
Training and skills development 
programs have been restructured 
and put under the direction of local 
Aboriginal communities, through 
the 60 elected ATSIC regional coun­
cils. Funding has been provided to 
implement the National Aboriginal 
H ealth Strategy, and Common­
w ealth  A borig in al H ousing 
programs have been restructured 
and put under the control of ATSIC.
A lthough I had announced 
proposals for the framework of the 
process of reconciliation before the 
Royal Commission reported, the 
concept of that process was en­
dorsed in the Final Report of the 
Royal C om m ission . Com m on­
wealth legislation has established a 
council of 25 people, the majority of 
whom are indigenous people, to 
guide the process of reconciliation at 
the national level. The council is 
chaired by Patrick Dodson, and its 
m em bers in clu d e G alarrw uy 
Yunupingu, Archie Barton, Jennie 
George and Ray Martin.
The process of reconciliation has 
three key objectives which seek to 
keep fa ith  ab so lu tely  w ith 
Aboriginal aspirations. First, it seeks 
to initiate activities to educate non- 
A boriginal A u stralian s about 
Aboriginal history, culture, dispos­
session  and con tin u ing  disad­
vantage, w ith  the ob jective of 
convincing the wider community of 
the need for governments to support 
Aborigines and Torres Strait Is­
lander people to give effect to their 
aspirations. The second objective of 
the process of reconciliation is to 
elevate Aboriginal aspirations and 
Aboriginal social justice issues as 
critical issues of the national agenda 
in the lead up to the centenary of 
Federation in 2001. Third, it aims to
place on the public policy agenda 
the question of a document or agree­
ment on the rights of indigenous 
people as one of the outcomes of the 
reconciliation process.
A treaty, 'makaratta' or agreement 
between Aborigines and Torres 
Strait Islander people and other 
Australians has been a long standing 
objective of indigenous people in 
this country but a process with the 
potential to secure such an agree­
ment has never before been put in 
place. In this process several matters 
of critical importance need to be re­
emphasised.
First, there has been no attempt 
made by the government to define 
the terms of any document, instru­
ment, treaty, compact or agreement 
which may result from the process. 
Second, there has been no attempt to 
give any final name to the document 
or documents. Third, the option has 
been left open for a separate docu­
ment related to Aboriginal people or 
a separate document for Torres Strait 
Islanders should this be the wish of 
Australian indigenous peoples. 
Fourth, no decision has been made 
on which party or parties should be 
responsible for negotiating any 
document. These matters have been 
deliberately left open and must, first 
and foremost, be the subject of exten­
sive consultation by Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander peoples.
It is time that Australian people got 
serious about the issue of a docu­
m ent. The m ost recent public 
opinion polls have told us that 65% 
of A ustralians agree that there 
should be a treaty with Australian 
indigenous peoples, and there has 
been a call by many indigenous 
people for such a document. In 
Canada there is a greater level of 
maturity in political discussion 
about treaties with Indian and Innuit 
people. Such modern treaty agree­
ments are supported by conserva­
tive politicians in that country as a 
means of addressing the aspirations 
of Canada's indigenous people.
As a result of the establishment of 
ATSIC, the response to the Royal
Commission into Aboriginal Deaths 
in Custody and the unanimous 
Commonwealth Parliamentary sup­
port for the process of reconciliation, 
an agenda has been set which com­
mits the nation to self-determination 
and social justice for indigenous 
people in this country.
ROBERT TICKNER is the federal 
Minister for Aboriginal Affairs.
A Platform fo r  the Right
Criticisms of Left positions and dis­
cussion on current issues in ALR 
have been interesting and useful. 
Events overseas and past acceptance 
of dogmas have combined to create 
serious problems for socialist ideas 
and the Left in Australia.
However, it is disappointing that the 
number of articles in ALR which are 
largely an intellectual wank is in­
creasing. The Howard interview in 
the August issue was a negative for 
the Left Failure of overseas socialist 
experiments, while creating massive 
immediate problems for socialist 
ideas, does not mean the Left should 
accept capitalism and feature its 
forem ost ad vocates. It w as a 
bureaucratic model of socialism 
which failed in Europe. Russian 
tanks crushed the Czech bid for 
socialist democracy in 1968.
Currently there is need for promo­
tion of creative alternatives to the 
increasingly crisis-ridden capitalist 
system. ALR was, after all, brought 
into being to further hum an 
progress, not merely to inflate egos 
and provide a platform for the ex­
treme Right of politics.
Aided by circumstance, Hawke and 
Keating used their positions in the 
Labor Party to help shift Australian 
politics to the right in the 1980s. The 
current drift in ALR, if not arrested, 
could be a pressure for a similar slide 
in the Left itself in the 1990s.
Max Bound, 
Kingston, Tasmania.
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Cringe Politics
Gough Whitlam's election in 1972 
was supposed to see it off forever. 
The Bicentenary in 1988 was to be 
its death knell. Keating's plans for 
a republic and a new flag have 
similar aspirations. But despite the 
best efforts of our finest political 
and artistic minds that peculiarly 
Australian phenomenon, the cul­
tural cringe, steadfastly refuses to 
roll over and play dead.
A series of recent occurrences tells 
the tale. First up we had the con­
troversy over the ABC's 'reality 
soap' Sylvania Waters. When this tell­
ing little slice of supposed real life hit 
the small screen a couple of months 
back what was most interesting 
about it wasn't the program itself, 
but the round of anguished hand- 
wringing that ensued. "Oh my God, 
whatever will they think of us over­
seas?" seemed to be the most com­
mon reaction, especially on the ABC 
itself. Andrew Olle and Margaret 
Throsby's 2BL programs were full of 
'experts' and listeners all bemoaning 
the damage they thought the pro­
gram would do to our 'national 
image', especially in Britain—as if 
this were something that rested en­
tirely on the domestic minutiae of 
one family.
Of course, a lot of it came down to 
pure snobbery, and nowhere was 
that better illustrated than in an ex­
traordinary front page piece by
Richard Glover in the Sydney Morn­
ing Herald which served not only to 
pour scorn on the family involved, 
but also to profile one of the runners- 
up in the lucky family stakes, a mul­
ticultural bunch of academics and 
artists. It wasn't that this family was 
more typical, argued Glover. Rather, 
they should have been chosen be­
cause they would have made for bet­
ter PR in the UK.
Then came the opening and closing 
ceremonies for the Olympic Games. 
I watched this with a group of people 
who all oohhhed and ahhhed at 
every slice of pyrotechnics, while 
simultaneously getting their knick­
ers in a knot about what sort of tacky 
ceremony Sydney would put on if it 
wins the 2000 Olympics. The Spanish 
had Culture and History coursing 
through their veins instead of blood, 
they said, whereas Sydney would 
undoubtedly fall back on a parade of 
20-foot tall cuddly koalas or some­
thing equally tacky.
Now, I lived in Barcelona for over a 
year in the mid-80s and can testify 
that the cultural pursuits of the 
average male Spaniard (or Catalan, if 
you prefer) frequently don't extend 
much beyond football, the bullfights, 
Madonna and the latest kick-boxing 
movie. Even my revealing that the 
whole Barcelona shebang had been 
choreographed by an Australian did 
little to arrest this particular bout of 
hand-wringing.
The third factor reveals what is es­
sentially the other side of the same 
coin. As a writer and sub-editor for 
various rock music magazines I be­
came used to receiving letters from 
readers imploring us to ignore what 
went on overseas on the grounds that 
Australia produced the best, most 
honest and no-bullshit rock bands on 
the planet, and that everything else 
was just a bunch of foreign nancies 
prancing around diverting the 
minds of young Australians from 
this incontrovertible fact. This at­
titude hit its apogee with a recent 
series of showcase gigs in Los An­
geles by Australian bands.
Dubbed 'The Wizards of Oz', and 
funded by taxpayers' dollars, it saw
som ething like ten A ustralian  
groups flown to LA at considerable 
expense in order to play in front of 
American record company execu­
tives. Invitations were issued to said 
executives imploring then to come to 
the gigs—not on the grounds that 
these were exciting bands that would 
make them lots of money but, rather, 
on the fact that they were from 
Australia. I don't know about you, 
but I don't give a flying fox where 
music comes from as long as it's 
good; Australia does indeed produce 
many fine artists, but I'm far from 
convinced that geography is any sort 
of decisive factor. The Americans, 
largely baffled by the whole market­
ing exercise and treating it as some­
thing of a joke, apparently agreed 
and largely stayed at home. I'm all 
for government supporting the local 
m usic industry, but ca n 't help 
w ondering if some better w ay 
couldn't have been found to spend 
my money.
What all this reveals is a self-con­
sciousness about nationality and 
identity that's proving incredibly 
durable. To many Australians—and 
this seems to be an attitude far more 
prevalent among those born in this 
country  than am ong recent 
migrants—art and culture from this 
country is either intrinsically inferior 
to anything overseas or it's above 
criticism simply because it's home­
grown.
Personally, I think that the idea of a 
republic and the removal of the 
Union Jack from the Australian flag 
are both long overdue, but I have my 
doubts as to whether they'll do any­
thing to alleviate the cultural cringe. 
That will happen only when we ac­
cept ourselves simply as we are, a 
diverse nation with its own cultural 
institutions that are no better and no 
worse than any other country's, only 
different. In the meantime, our fre­
quently crippling self-consciousness 
will keep the old beast alive and kick­
ing for a good few years yet.
STUART HITCHINGS is a Sydney 
freelance journalist whose toes 
steadfastly refuse to curl while 
watching Sylvania Waters.
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ALLEN  & U N W IN
T H E  O T H E R  S ID E
Fault Lines, Guerrilla Saints and 
the Tm e Heart o f  Rock V  Roll 
Ruben M artinez
In this vivid collage of reports 
and reflections, interviews and 
poems, Ruben Martinez has 
assembled an unsettling and 
inspiring picture of the youth 
cultures of Los Angeles and 
Mexico City, of San Salvador, 
Tijuana and Havana.
Written with both anger and 
optimism, The Other Side is an 
engagingly personal book, but it 
is also a powerful document of a 
unique and perhaps prophetic 
moment in the history of the 
Americas. This is a story of 
ambivalence, infiltration and 
survival: a story of the future.
Verso Septem ber 1992 182pp 
ISBN 0 86091 370 8 lie $49.95
IN  T H E O R Y
Classes, Nations, Literatures 
A ijaz Ahmad
Setting himself against the 
growing tendency to homog­
enize Third  W orld' literatures 
and cultures, Aijaz Ahmad has 
produced a spirited critique of 
the major theoretical statements 
on 'colonial discourse' and post­
colonialism', dismantling many 
of the commonplaces and 
conceits that dominate contem­
porary cultural criticism. Eru­
dite and lucid, Ahmad's 
remapping of the terrain of 
current cultural theory is certain 
to provoke passionate response.
Verso O ctober 1992 368pp 
ISBN 0 86091 372 4 he $55.00
A Z O N E  O F E N G A G E M E N T  
Perry Anderson
The texts in this volume offer 
critical assessments of leading 
figures in contemporary intellec­
tual life, who are in different ways 
thinkers at the intersection of 
history and politics. They include 
Roberto Unger, Geoffrey de Ste. 
Croix, Isaac Deutscher, Norberto 
Bobbio, Isaiah Berlin, Michael 
Mann, W.G. Runciman, Andreas 
Hillgruber, Fernand Braudel, Max 
Weber, Ernest Gellner, Carlo 
Ginzburg, and Marshall Berman.
A concluding chapter looks at the 
idea of the end of history, recently 
advanced by Francis Fukuyama, in 
its successive versions from the 
19th century to the present, and 
considers the situation of socialism 
today in the light of it.
Verso September 1992 402pp 
ISBN 0 86091 595 6 pb  $39.95
B E Y O N D  FEM A LE 
M A S O C H IS M
Memory-work and Politics 
Frigga Haug
Frigga Haug explores the connec­
tions between Marxist theory and 
the emancipation of women, a 
project which necessarily involves, 
as she explains, 'diverting a 
powerful and long-standing anger 
into detective work'.
Under the headings Socialization, 
Work and Politics, she combines 
the fruits of these investigations 
with the influential 'memory- 
work' she has pioneered with 
women's collectives, to throw 
startling new light on a wide range 
of themes and issues.
Verso O ctober 1992 286pp 
ISBN 0 86091 562 X pb $39.95
P R IM A T E  V IS IO N S
Gender, Race, and Nature in the 
World o f Modern Science 
Donna Haraway
What counts as nature in the late 
twentieth century? How do we 
create scientific disciplines and 
histories of science? How are the 
issues of race and gender written 
into the ways we imagine the 
natural world? Why do we 
study animals? These fundamen­
tal questions are at the heart of 
primatology— the study of 
monkeys and apes— in the 20th 
century. In Primate Visions 
historian of biology Donna 
Haraway builds the primate 
story—our understanding of 
apes and humans—and explains 
its multicultural roots, its myths, 
its relation to gender and race.
Verso August 1992 496pp 
ISBN 0 86091 582 4 p b  $39.95
W O M E N  A N D  T H E  N EW  
G E R M A N  C IN E M A  
Julia Knight
In Women and the New German 
Cinema Julia Knight examines 
how restrictive social, economic 
and institutional conditions have 
compounded the neglect of the 
new women directors. Rejecting 
the traditional auteur approach, 
she explores the principal charac­
teristics of women's film-making 
in the 1970s and 1980s, in particu­
lar the role of the women's 
movement, the concern with the 
notion of a 'feminine aesthetic', 
women's entry into the main­
stream, and the emergence of a 
so-called post-feminist cinema.
This timely and comprehen­
sive study will be essential 
reading for everyone concerned 
with contemporary cinema and 
feminism.
Verso Septem ber 1992 232pp 
ISBN 0 86091 568 9 pb $32.95
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